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ABSTRACT 
  The recent recession has shone a very public spotlight on the 
perilous financial conditions of many American states. At the same 
time, it has renewed academic interest in the question of excessive state 
debt—its causes and possible cures. Scholars who see risk 
externalization as a primary driver of systematic overborrowing have 
proposed bankruptcy legislation for the states as one solution. Such 
advocates argue that a formal debt-adjustment mechanism could 
reduce the appeal of federal bailouts and thereby curtail the moral 
hazard leading to excessive debt. But given the states’ unilateral power 
to set the terms of default, it is hard to see why an opportunistic state 
would be inclined voluntarily to invoke an ex post debt-adjustment 
mechanism—and indeed this Article shows that even under existing 
law states could effectively opt into the federal bankruptcy procedures 
of Chapter 9 if they so desired. An ex ante approach is needed.  
  This Article identifies one such ex ante approach, “tax-credit 
borrowing,” and argues that with minimal changes to federal tax 
policy, this approach could reduce risk externalization more 
effectively than bankruptcy legislation can. The advantage of tax-
credit borrowing in this context stems from its capacity to preclude 
default by toggling the plaintiff/defendant distinction that lies at the 
heart of modern sovereign-immunity doctrine. Without a credible 
threat of default, a state’s leverage in bailout negotiations and the 
concomitant moral hazard would be greatly reduced. But tax-credit 
borrowing would have important implications for state fiscal policy 
even if agency problems (rather than risk externalization) better 
explain state borrowing habits. This Article shows how the availability 
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of risk-free debt could reduce borrowing costs and improve the 
monitoring of state political actors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Detroit’s 2013 petition for Chapter 91 bankruptcy relief2 can be 
read as the coda to a dramatic yet idiosyncratic tale of economic 
decline. Challenges from abroad to the domestic automotive industry, 
rapid depopulation, and questionable leadership tell a remarkable 
and discomforting story. But in many respects the financial problems 
Detroit faces today are similar to, if currently more pronounced than, 
the troubles confronting many towns and cities across the country. 
The economic slump following the 2008 housing-market implosion 
exposed the precarious financial position of many American states 
too. Declining real-property values and employment levels combined 
to erode the tax base. At the same time, spending obligations 
attached to countercyclical welfare programs, such as Medicaid, 
 
 1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012).  
 2. Declaration of Kevyn D. Orr in Support of City of Detroit, Michigan’s Statement of 
Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, In re City of Detroit, 498 
B.R. 776 (Bankr. E.D. Mich., filed July 18, 2013) (No. 2:13-bk-53846).  
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strained what revenue states could raise.3 The net result has been to 
underline these states’ massive debt obligations, particularly bond 
and retirement-benefit obligations. Credit-rating agencies have 
repeatedly downgraded the general-obligation ratings of the most 
troubled states, including California, Illinois, Michigan, and New 
Jersey.4 And commentators have begun to worry about the first wave 
of state defaults since the 1890s.5 
Signs of a reviving national economy could lessen some concerns. 
In June of 2013, for example, the California legislature surprised 
observers with its first budget surplus in years.6 Yet the picture is far 
from sanguine. Public-employee pension funds have been chronically 
underfunded. Thus, for example, California achieved its “surplus” by 
underfunding its teachers’ pensions to the tune of $4.5 billion.7 
Experts calculate that pension trust funds in some states, notably 
Illinois, will be exhausted within the decade.8 The most troubled 
states are at best out of the frying pan. 
Responding to this predicament, a number of academics and 
political figures have urged Congress to permit states to restructure or 
otherwise shed debt through a formal, federal bankruptcy process 
modeled on Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. A series of op-eds 
 
 3. Adam J. Levitin, Fiscal Federalism and the Limits of Bankruptcy, in WHEN STATES GO 
BROKE 214, 216–19 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012); Damon A. Silvers, 
Obligations Without the Power to Fund Them, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra, at 40, 45–50.  
 4. See, e.g., Pamela M. Prah, Adam Rotmil & Stephen C. Fehr, Infographic: S&P State 
Credit Ratings, 2001–2014, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (June 9, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/
en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/06/09/sp-ratings-2014.  
 5. Arkansas defaulted on its bond obligations in 1933, the only state to have defaulted 
since the beginning of the twentieth century. For representative concerns over state default, see, 
for example, Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Mounting Debts by States Stoke Fears of 
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at A1 (reporting financial analysts’ fear that “because many 
state and local governments have so much debt—several trillion dollars’ worth, with much of it 
off the books and largely hidden from view”—their debt “could overwhelm them in the next 
few years”); Mark Muro, Will States Default on Their Debt?, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/the-avenue/81688/will-states-default-their-debt (“Look for 
the unprecedented times and the forced end of business-as-usual, with radical restructurings 
absolutely necessary.”).  
 6. Jim Christie, California Governor and Lawmakers Strike Budget Deal, REUTERS (June 
10, 2013, 9:07 PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/11/us-california-budget-
idUSBRE95A01N20130611. 
 7. David Henderson, California’s Phony Budget Surplus, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (June 
1, 2013), http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2013/06/californias_pho.html.  
 8. Olivia S. Mitchell, Public Pension Pressures in the United States, in WHEN STATES GO 
BROKE, supra note 3, at 67. 
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has made the case in the popular press.9 Meanwhile law reviews have 
witnessed the growth of what one commentator dubs a “cottage 
industry” devoted to debating the merits and design of a state-
bankruptcy regime.10 
The state-bankruptcy proposals have an intuitively surprising 
ambition. Since the pioneering work of Professors Douglas Baird and 
Thomas Jackson in the 1980s, economically minded scholars have 
generally understood bankruptcy as a corrective to the familiar 
collective-action problems attending individual and corporate 
financial distress—the so-called common-pool and debt-overhang 
problems.11 These dynamics are at best attenuated in the public 
 
 9. Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Op-Ed., Better Off Bankrupt: States Should Have the 
Option of Bankruptcy Protection to Deal with Their Budget Crises, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, 
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/jan/27/opinion/la-oe-gingrich-bankruptcy-20110127 
(“Federal bailouts must come to an end. Federal taxpayers in states that balance their budgets 
should not have to bail out the irresponsible, pandering politicians who cannot balance their 
budgets. Congress must allow a safe, orderly way under federal bankruptcy law for states to 
reorganize their finances.”); Grover G. Norquist & Patrick Gleason, Let States Go Bankrupt, 
POLITICO (Dec. 24, 2010, 8:52 AM, updated Dec. 24, 2010, 9:48 AM), http://www.politico
.com/news/stories/1210/46777.html (“[F]ederal legislation allowing states to file bankruptcy 
might be the only way to avoid a federal bailout of the most fiscally reckless states in the 
union.”). These pieces borrowed from David Skeel’s op-ed. proposals. See David Skeel, Op-Ed., 
A Bankruptcy Law—Not Bailouts—for the States, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, http://online.wsj
.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703779704576073522930513118 [hereinafter Skeel, A 
Bankruptcy Law]; David Skeel, Give Bankruptcy a Chance, WEEKLY STANDARD (June 29, 
2009), http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/658hmvhc.asp 
[hereinafter Skeel, Give Bankruptcy]; David Skeel, Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt, WEEKLY 
STANDARD (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/give-states-way-go-
bankrupt_518378.html [hereinafter Skeel, Give States]. 
 10. Clayton P. Gillette, Commentary, Bankruptcy and Its By-Products: A Comment on 
Skeel, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2013) [hereinafter Gillette, Bankruptcy By-Products]. 
Representative pieces include Anna Gelpern, Commentary, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign 
Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1095 (2013); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, 
and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2012) [hereinafter Gillette, 
Fiscal Federalism]; Richard M. Hynes, State Default and Synthetic Bankruptcy, 87 WASH. L. 
REV. 657 (2012); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011); Stephen L. 
Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV. 322 (2011); David 
A. Skeel, Jr., Address, Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1063 (2013) [hereinafter Skeel, Is Bankruptcy]; David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012) [hereinafter Skeel, States of Bankruptcy]. 
 11. A common pool refers to a situation where it is in the best interest of each participant, 
acting alone, to maximize use of a shared asset, even where doing so would reduce the asset’s 
aggregate value. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW 10–19 (1986); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 127, 132–33 (1986); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy 
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 864–65 (1982). Debt overhang occurs 
when existing debt deters new investment because the benefits from new investment will go to 
existing debtors rather than to new investors. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., 
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context, however, in which creditor remedies are closely 
circumscribed and where states can raise capital by fiat.12 Rather, 
proponents of state bankruptcy take aim at what they see as a moral 
hazard associated with the possibility of a federal bailout.13 
On this theory, adhered to even by many skeptics of state-
bankruptcy legislation,14 states may systematically overborrow secure 
in the knowledge that if things get dire enough the national 
government will come to their rescue. Spillover costs and the risk of 
contagion associated with a major default all but guarantee assistance; 
the federal government cannot credibly promise not to intervene. 
Moral hazard in this context arises not from explicit insurance, but 
from an expectation that the state will be viewed as “too big to fail.” 
If the federal apparatus must prop up (apparently) overleveraged 
banks and insurers, why not overleveraged states? Such, anyway, was 
Warren Buffett’s reasoning in an interview laying out this view.15 To 
the extent a state’s default could infect the broader economy, 
strategic state actors would likely act as though the federal 
government were the state’s insurer. 
The proponents of a state-bankruptcy regime seek to relieve this 
dynamic. If states enjoyed a forum, endowed with the majesty of law, 
in which creditors could be forced to take a haircut in the name of 
solvency and stability, then perhaps at least the pathetic argument for 
bailout could be resisted. As one commentator put it, “The appeal of 
 
Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 474 (2010); see generally Stewart C. Myers, The 
Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977) (explaining how the existence 
of corporate debt can weaken the corporation’s incentive to undertake good future 
investments). 
 12. Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 
YALE L.J. 888, 910 (2012); Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 10, at 295; Michael W. 
McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 429 (1993). 
 13. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 324. Moral hazard refers to the propensity of an 
insured actor to take on supraoptimal risk because the insurer will bear some or all of the costs 
of the risk’s materializing. 
 14. See Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 10, at 312–13 (“Bailouts create moral hazard 
and impede efforts to impose fiscal discipline on localities. Bailouts violate the underpinnings of 
fiscal federalism by imposing on nonresidents the costs of decisions made solely by local 
officials.”); Gelpern, supra note 10, at 1113. 
 15. Jamie McGee & Darrell Preston, Buffett Says GM Rescue May Mean U.S. Can’t Say No 
to States, BLOOMBERG (May 5, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-
05/buffett-says-gm-rescue-may-mean-u-s-can-t-say-no-to-states-facing-default.html.  
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bankruptcy-for-states is that it would give the federal government a 
compelling reason to resist the bailout urge.”16 
Capitol Hill has evidently scotched state-bankruptcy legislation 
for the time being.17 Perhaps, one might think, we will never know 
about the merits of a “Chapter 9 for states.” Yet a fatalistic attitude 
on this score is unjustified. Although under existing law states are 
formally ineligible for bankruptcy relief,18 in practical terms they 
could, with some creative structuring, make their finances eligible for 
adjustment in Chapter 9. States could leverage the Bankruptcy 
Code’s capacious definition of “municipality,” which is broad enough 
to encompass an instrumentality chartered for the sole purpose of 
issuing debt.19 
That states have not made themselves eligible for bankruptcy in 
this way indicates foundational problems with arguments that a state-
bankruptcy regime would alleviate bailout incentives and thus moral 
hazard. Indeed, state-bankruptcy skeptics have identified these 
problems as challenges to hypothetical legislation. First, sovereign 
immunity implies that states do not need federal authorization to 
adjust debts, which they can effectively discharge or reduce through 
default.20 Second, the moral-hazard theory21 itself suggests that 
strategic state actors will not voluntarily cede the power to externalize 
risk, a power that maximizes the joint surplus of the state and its 
creditors. One is tempted to conclude that voluntary, ex post 
correctives to state moral hazard are doomed for these reasons. 
This Article identifies an ex ante financing mechanism that could 
more effectively reduce the moral hazard associated with too-big-to-
fail thinking. Specifically, this Article suggests that widespread use of 
“tax-credit borrowing” (in place of traditional forms of state debt) 
could decrease the prospect of state defaults. State debt typically 
constitutes a promise that the treasury will pay a specified sum at a 
specified future date. This Article proposes recharacterizing some or 
all of these obligations, be they to a state’s lenders, vendors, or 
employees. Instead of promising a cash outlay, the state would 
 
 16. Skeel, Give States, supra note 9. 
 17. Nicole Bullock, Lawmakers Resist Bankruptcy for US States, CNBC (Feb. 15, 2011, 6:45 
AM), www.cnbc.com/id/41595577. 
 18. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 19. See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text. 
 20. See Hynes, supra note 10, at 676–79; Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. 
Federalism, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 3, at 123, 131–32.  
 21. See Rodden, supra note 20, at 124. 
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promise to allow the holder of a debt instrument to offset her taxes by 
the amount owed. The state’s coffers would feel no effect—one more 
dollar payable is the same as one less dollar receivable.22 
The difference is not financial but legal, trading on the 
plaintiff/defendant distinction at the heart of modern sovereign-
immunity doctrine. States can default on traditional debt because 
creditors lack a remedy. A state wishing to repudiate a vested tax 
credit, however, can do so only by collecting the taxes at issue. This 
would require the state, rather than the creditors, to invoke judicial 
process. As a plaintiff, the state would be unable to invoke sovereign 
immunity; its creditors would be free to defend the tax-underpayment 
action by invoking the Constitution’s Contract Clause. If the threat of 
default can give states the whip hand in negotiations with the federal 
government, then tax-credit borrowing could eliminate the moral 
hazard by curtailing default. 
At the outset, I must confess agnosticism about the empirical 
significance of the moral hazard that state-bankruptcy proponents 
identify. Their theory is sound enough, to be sure. Risk 
externalization—the tendency to shift the costs associated with 
uncertain, bad outcomes—has preoccupied many would-be reformers 
of corporate, banking, and insurance law, to name only a few subjects. 
Plainly it is a plausible concern. And in looking at recent bailouts 
around the world, from AIG to Greece, it is hard (for the cynical 
among us, anyway) not to detect the sure whiff of gamesmanship. 
Yet thoughtful observers are not unanimous on this question, 
one that seems to elude objective measurement.23 Some have argued 
 
 22. This is mathematically true, but its truth does not necessarily imply that relevant 
players in the markets and at the polls will think it so. A large and growing literature on tax 
salience suggests that in some circumstances financially identical obligations are widely thought 
to bear divergent costs. For an introduction to the literature, see generally David Gamage & 
Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. 
REV. 19 (2011). That said, there are good reasons to think the financial identity of traditional 
and tax-credit-borrowing arrangements would be clear. First, prices in a competitive market are 
set by the marginal rather than inframarginal participants. As long as the marginal potential 
lender sees that a dollar is a dollar, yields will equilibrate except to the extent risk properties 
differ. Second, the two forms of borrowing are the same with respect to timing and the 
immediate incidence of the financial burden on the state treasury. To illustrate the intuition, 
imagine that a charitably minded person wishes to subsidize a shopper’s grocery bill. The donor 
stands at the checkout line and presents the shopper with a choice: he can either have a one-
dollar note before paying the cashier, or the donor can pay the cashier directly, reducing the 
shopper’s bill by the same amount. It is hard to imagine the shopper caring; indeed, he would 
likely find the choice puzzling. 
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that constitutional taxing and debt restrictions, rather than a coherent 
externalization strategy, are to blame for the states’ current 
problems.24 Others posit more generally that subnational governments 
are simply unresponsive to the subtler incentives of federal fiscal 
policy.25 Moreover, any externalization incentive within a jurisdiction 
is bound to meet opposition from within as well as outside state lines. 
When financial distress appears on the horizon, creditor coalitions 
will inevitably exert what influence they can to assure a policy of debt 
repayment: A federal bailout is never certain and is in any event 
unlikely to make creditors whole. How this political dynamic plays 
out in any given case will turn on particulars still obscure after three 
centuries of political economy. This Article aims not to enter a public-
choice debate, but only to note that the extent of states’ apparent 
moral hazard is in doubt (if indeed it makes any sense in this context 
to speak of the state as a unified whole). 
The risk-externalization theory of excessive state debt calls for a 
straightforward and normatively attractive application of tax-credit 
borrowing. The question this Article poses (and begins to answer) is, 
however, more general: what might tax-credit borrowing look like in 
a world where states are inclined to overborrow? What follows should 
therefore interest even readers who think state borrowing practices 
have little to do with risk externalization. For example, the principal 
competing theories of excessive state debt stem from a standard 
agency problem: politicians overborrow because they are not 
effectively monitored. They favor spending on projects for which they 
can take credit or gain favors, and they are inclined to push costs to 
the future, long after they leave office. On this view the people 
affected by a state’s long-term financial prospects do a poor job of 
reining in borrowing. They reward near-term spending and tax-relief 
initiatives at the expense of future solvency; they are draped in fiscal 
illusion. Here again the introduction of tax-credit borrowing could 
have significant consequences for fiscal policy. Certainty of 
repayment means cheaper debt in the first instance. But such 
certainty also reduces the incentive to monitor—rather, it shifts the 
monitoring incentive because it shifts the incidence of financial risk 
 
 23. For a discussion of how tax-credit borrowing could shed light on the empirical 
significance of risk externalization, see infra Part II.A. 
 24. Levitin, supra note 3, at 218; Silvers, supra note 3, at 50–52. 
 25. Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities, 39 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 639, 677 (2012); Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 866 
(2012). 
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from creditors to taxpayers and residents. Whether tax-credit 
borrowing could be a tool for good or ill is thus a question of political 
economy on which this Article seeks to shed light. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the law 
governing traditional state borrowing practices and explains why 
states have difficulty creating risk-free or otherwise superpriority debt 
obligations. It then introduces tax-credit borrowing as a solution to 
that particular problem of public finance. Parts II through IV 
consider applications of tax-credit borrowing to the problem of 
excessive state debt. Part II defines the problem and gives 
background on the leading explanations. Part III takes up the risk-
externalization theory, describing the state-bankruptcy debate and 
arguing that tax-credit borrowing can better cure moral hazard than 
debt-adjustment legislation. Part IV discusses how tax-credit 
borrowing could mitigate agency problems often thought to cause 
excessive debt. 
I.  THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF TAX-CREDIT BORROWING 
This Article’s most modest ambition is to identify a solution to a 
seemingly intractable problem in public finance: states’ inability to 
issue debt credibly stratified by priority of payment obligation. More 
specifically, it seeks to identify a mechanism by which states could 
borrow against risk-free debt obligations. 
Prioritized debt structures are ubiquitous in the private sphere. 
In the business context, for example, a firm wishing to raise cash for 
current expenditures may simultaneously (or, more typically, 
iteratively) borrow from some lenders on a secured basis and from 
others with unsecured bonds or notes.26 The debtor firm’s repayment 
obligation is owed equally to secured and unsecured creditors, but the 
secured creditor faces less risk of impairment and therefore charges a 
lower interest rate. State law permits the secured creditor to foreclose 
on and sell mortgaged property to satisfy its debt without respect to 
the effect foreclosure may have on unsecured or otherwise junior 
 
 26. Borrowers are of course not limited to the secured/unsecured dichotomy. Second-lien 
secured debt and subordinated unsecured debt are staples of corporate finance. Individuals 
have the same opportunity. A consumer debtor may, for example, use the title to her Porsche as 
collateral for a secured loan and at the same time borrow on an unsecured basis by swiping her 
credit card. 
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creditors.27 In the event of a bankruptcy filing, the absolute-priority 
rule ensures that secured claims be paid in full before junior interests 
receive anything from the estate.28 
Even the most senior creditor of a business firm faces risk, of 
course. The collateral may lose value to such a degree that the 
creditor is impaired notwithstanding her repossession or foreclosure 
rights. But standard covenants can reduce the risk to something 
approaching zero. Secured loans often decree a default—and thus 
accelerate repayment obligations and remedies for nonpayment—if, 
for example, the debtor’s debt-to-assets ratio falls below a specified 
threshold. The more conservative the ratio, the safer and cheaper the 
debt is. 
Prioritizing obligations can allow a debtor to reduce total 
borrowing costs.29 Yet the remedial law applicable to states prevents 
them from issuing traditional superpriority debt broadly. The states’ 
immunity from enforcement suits impairs their ability to make 
credible commitments at all—let alone priority commitments. In 
other words, in addition to paying for the time-value of money and 
for the risk that assets will be insufficient to cover debt, a state 
borrower must compensate lenders for the political risk that the state 
will choose to default and reject a judicial remedy. Thus, in the 
sovereign context, the issuance of priority obligations affords little or 
no reduction in borrowing costs (unless backed by collateral that a 
creditor could practically seize). This Part describes the remedial 
problem and then introduces the concept of tax-credit borrowing as a 
commitment device that can create superpriority, risk-free debt.  
 
 27. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs repossession of moveable assets. 
See U.C.C. § 9-601, 9-608–10 (2010). The law of foreclosure on real property varies by 
jurisdiction, but it is an available remedy in every state.  
 28. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070–71 
(2012) (analyzing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(a)); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. 
LaSalle St. P’Ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444–49 (1999) (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)); Case v. L.A. 
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114–16 (1939) (stating that secured creditors come before 
unsecured creditors in reorganization law). 
 29. Why exactly this is so remains a longstanding puzzle. See generally Franco Modigliani 
& Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 
AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) (showing that under certain assumptions, investors should be 
indifferent to the capital structure of a firm). The answer may lie in the diversity of lenders’ risk 
preferences. It may also be a function of variable monitoring costs. See Saul Levmore, Monitors 
and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 50–59 (1982) (arguing 
that economies in the monitoring of debtor behavior may explain secured lending).  
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A. Remedial Law as an Obstacle to Priority Borrowing 
The states’ inability to prioritize debt is a function in the first 
instance of sovereign immunity. Creditors have long found their 
attempts to secure payments from the states frustrated in federal 
court.30 In the well-known 1890 case of Hans v. Louisiana,31 itself an 
action seeking payment on a state bond, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Eleventh Amendment, and the principles of 
sovereignty underlying it, to block federal-question jurisdiction over 
suits against the states by their own citizens.32 Although Ex parte 
Young33 soon put sovereign immunity’s longevity, or at least its scope, 
in doubt,34 the modern Court has consistently held that sovereign 
immunity bars federal actions seeking money damages from a state’s 
treasury.35 The picture for creditors is almost as bleak in the state 
judiciaries. Alden v. Maine36 prevents Congress from subjecting 
nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in the states’ own 
courts.37 The states are thus free simply to deny creditors a forum for 
recovery, and some version of immunity is the norm in every state. 
One study reports that today forty of the fifty states bar money-
damages suits in their own courts, and none consents to damages 
actions in federal court.38 Nor can creditors of those states that do 
allow damages actions rest easy. Legislatures remain free to strip the 
courts of jurisdiction in anticipation of a default.39 And enforcement 
of a judgment could present its own difficulties.40 
In short, state creditors lack coercive power to enforce a debt 
owed. They are at the mercy of state fiscal expediency. In practical 
terms this means that state politicians may legislate debt adjustments 
as they see fit. Suppose a financially strapped state wished to pay only 
 
 30. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667–74 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 49–52 (1944).  
 31. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 32. Id. at 20–21. 
 33. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 34. Id. at 149–52.  
 35. See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011); 
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667–74. For an extensive treatment of sovereign immunity’s doctrinal 
development, see generally JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: 
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1991). 
 36. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 37. Id. at 755–56. 
 38. Gelpern, supra note 12, at 901. 
 39. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 750–51. 
 40. Gelpern, supra note 12, at 900. 
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seventy-five cents on the dollar for a series of bonds due next year. 
This might be accomplished by reducing the bonds’ principal, 
extending their maturity, or reducing their interest rate. To 
accomplish this, the state legislature could declare its intention to 
default and permit holders to exchange the now-worthless paper for 
new, amended bonds.41 Alternatively, the state could decline to pay a 
class of debt outright. In this way the state can unilaterally adjust its 
debts without creditor consent or any kind of federal imprimatur. 
What of state constitutional provisions making certain classes of 
debt sacrosanct? Many constitutions provide that debts are backed by 
the state’s “full faith and credit.”42 Could this kind of guarantee 
invalidate legislation aimed at strategic default? It is possible that a 
governor opposed to default could cite constitutional language of this 
sort to justify a decision to buck legislative will. To the extent such a 
governor thought the legislature’s repudiation ultra vires, he could 
perhaps pay the state’s debts in defiance of legislative repudiation. 
But this kind of move would be of doubtful validity43—and probably 
unpopular in a repudiating state. Certainly, given the protections of 
sovereign immunity, it is hard to see how a constitutional right to 
payment could help creditors in the courts. 
In addition to blocking creditor remedies using sovereign 
immunity, states might also be able to restructure their debt 
obligations unilaterally by attacking the substantive debts themselves. 
This might be accomplished through a composition statute setting the 
 
 41. This is not merely a theoretical possibility. In the period following Reconstruction, a 
number of southern states repudiated bond obligations. At times, their strategy was to declare 
outstanding instruments invalid, but permit holders to redeem them in exchange for newly 
issued securities granting less attractive terms. In 1874, for example, Louisiana had bonds 
outstanding with a face value of $18,000,000. John Norton Pomeroy, The Supreme Court and 
State Repudiation—The Virginia and Louisiana Cases, 17 AM. L. REV. 684, 699 (1883). 
Legislators declared that the debts were fraudulent and that the state would not pay. Id. In a 
sort of “compromise,” the legislature enacted a law permitting bondholders to exchange their 
instruments for new “consolidation” bonds worth 60 percent of the outstanding bonds’ nominal 
value. Id. at 700. More than two-thirds of creditors tendered their bonds. Id. To their chagrin, 
Louisiana ultimately defaulted on its obligations under the consolidation bonds. Id. 
 42. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a); LA. CONST. art. VII, § 6(C); WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 6, 
cl. 2(a).  
 43. Although a governor’s powers are a matter of state constitutional law, it is easy to 
imagine a legislature’s decision on this score being final. For example, a legislature might 
functionally repudiate debt by refusing to appropriate funding sufficient for its service or 
redemption. Although one can imagine arguments to the contrary, it probably exceeds an 
executive’s authority to raid funds appropriated for one purpose to satisfy his view of obligation 
toward another.  
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new terms of repayment.44 In Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of 
Asbury Park,45 the Court upheld a New Jersey composition scheme 
under which the state altered the maturity and interest rates 
associated with municipal bonds issued by Asbury Park.46 During the 
boom of the 1920s, the city had borrowed extensively to fund capital-
intensive improvements on the boardwalk.47 The reduction in tax 
revenue associated with the Great Depression, coupled with cost 
overruns and perhaps shoddy management, meant that the city could 
not hope to repay its debt.48 Asbury Park defaulted and was placed 
under state management akin to receivership.49 By statute the state’s 
supreme court was permitted to adjust the interest and maturity terms 
of municipal debt, provided that 85 percent of claimants consented.50 
The court approved such an agreement, and dissenting bondholders 
brought their case to the federal judiciary.51 The Supreme Court 
upheld the regime against a Contract Clause challenge.52 In the 
Court’s view, although the composition reduced the nominal amount 
owed on the bonds, it did not impair any practical right enjoyed by 
the bondholders.53 The city’s promise to pay was a mere “paper right” 
because the bondholders’ sole remedy, mandamus against local 
officials to compel a tax, had proved historically, and as a practical 
matter, to be an “empty right to litigate.”54 
Congress quickly abrogated Faitoute. States may no longer 
compose the debts of their municipalities absent the consent of each 
affected creditor; Chapter 9 is now the only route to adjustment of 
municipal debt.55 But Faitoute’s rationale would seem to survive intact 
 
 44. For an explanation and defense of such “synthetic” bankruptcy, see Hynes, supra note 
10, at 686–90. See also George Triantis, Bankruptcy for the States and by the States, in WHEN 
STATES GO BROKE, supra note 3, at 237, 243 (arguing that states can and should create their 
own bankruptcy regimes). 
 45. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942). 
 46. Id. at 516.  
 47. Id. at 503. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 505. 
 50. Id. at 504–05. 
 51. Id. at 507. 
 52. Id. at 516. 
 53. Id. at 512–16 (“The Constitution is ‘intended to preserve practical and substantial 
rights, not to maintain theories.’” (quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904))). 
 54. Id. at 510; see McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 430–33 (generally agreeing with 
the Court’s assessment of the practical value of the mandamus remedy in this context). 
 55. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (“[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of 
indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such 
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with respect to a state’s authority to compose its own debts. The right 
to payment from the state treasury is much more precarious, much 
more in the way of a “paper right,” than is the right to payment from 
a municipality. However limited the value of mandamus might have 
been in the context of a suit against a municipality, sovereign 
immunity can preclude a remedy against a state entirely. 
The advantage a state could derive from a composition statute 
analogous to the one in Faitoute should not be overstated. Some 
states’ constitutions would seem to preclude the tactic, for example by 
declaring that debts are to be backed by the state’s “full faith and 
credit.”56 Nor is it clear the courts would sanction an extreme 
composition statute, were they to hear a challenge. The judgment in 
Faitoute is more than seventy years old, and it rested as much on the 
acquiescence of a supermajority of impaired creditors, and on the 
observed reasonableness of the composition in question, as on the 
emptiness of creditor remedies.57 In any event, though, sovereign 
immunity likely means that state composition would be effective 
whether or not it is substantively constitutional. 
The states’ unilateral debt-adjustment authority poses a 
seemingly intractable problem of credible commitment. Apparent 
workarounds are doubtful for legal and pragmatic reasons. One 
obvious question is why states do not simply consent to suit in federal 
court if they wish to convey their seriousness.58 In short, the answer is 
that doing so presents an analogous commitment problem. To be 
sure, states are free to waive their sovereign immunity.59 But apart 
from consent predicated on the receipt of federal spending, or where 
 
composition; and . . . a judgment entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does not 
consent to such composition.”). The reach of this abrogation is now being tested in Puerto Rico, 
which recently enacted legislation creating a mechanism for the adjustment of its municipal 
corporations’ debts. Ley para el Cumplimiento con las Deudas y para la Recuperación de las 
Corporaciones Públicas de Puerto Rico, P. del S. 1164, Ley Núm. 71 (June 28, 2014). Puerto 
Rico contends that § 903 does not extend to the Territory, because Puerto Rico is not a “State” 
for purposes of determining Chapter 9 eligibility. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012) (“The term 
‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of defining 
who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.”). 
 56. See sources cited supra note 42. 
 57. Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 514. 
 58. See Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 334 n.68 (“A review of randomly selected state bond 
indentures and state statutes revealed no effective waivers by states of sovereign immunity in 
federal court.”).  
 59. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617–18 (2002); 
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 n.19 (1982); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 
447 (1883). 
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Congress has otherwise abrogated immunity,60 states appear free to 
renege on a stated policy of consent.61 Constitutional amendments 
could perhaps do the trick—federal courts might ignore a state 
attorney general’s invocation of sovereign immunity if her state’s 
constitution flatly prohibited it. But such a significant political change 
is not likely in the offing. 
In limited circumstances, states might structure borrowing 
transactions to circumvent the immunity problem and mirror secured 
debt in the private context. A simple model would involve a state 
pledging and transferring possession of assets as security for 
repayment. If the state were to default, the creditor could satisfy her 
claim without judicial assistance. Of course, the utility of such a 
transaction would be sharply circumscribed by the paucity of 
government assets amenable to this kind of pledge. It is hard to 
imagine how a creditor could “take possession” of state highways, 
parkland, or, for that matter, the capitol building. A more 
sophisticated model might resemble the sale-leaseback transactions 
into which some states have in fact entered in recent years.62 Even 
here, though, the scope of a state’s borrowing capacity is quite 
limited. The public-trust doctrine prohibits the sale of many state 
assets,63 and it is not at all clear that a creditor holding title could call 
 
 60. For a doctrinal overview of Congress’s abrogation authority, see Rebecca E. Zietlow, 
Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 141, 182–89 (2002). But note that Zietlow’s discussion predates Central Virginia 
Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), in which the Supreme Court held that 
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity via its power to make “uniform Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 
356, 378–79 (2006). 
 61. See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858) (holding that a state could 
withdraw statutory consent to be sued on a defaulted bond); see also Iowa Tribe of Kan. & Neb. 
v. Salazar, 607 F.3d 1225, 1235 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The logic of Beers has withstood the test of 
time.”). 
 62. See Cindy Holden, Calif. Governor Brown Cancels Sale of State Properties, CAL. 
NEWSWIRE (Feb. 10, 2011), http://californianewswire.com/2011/02/10/CNW8510_000915.php 
(discussing California’s scuttled sale-leaseback proposal); Jennifer Steinhauer, In Need of Cash, 
Arizona Puts Offices on Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at A16 (discussing Arizona’s current 
sale-leaseback regime). In a sale-leaseback transaction, the owner of a valuable asset sells the 
asset for a lump-sum payment, but continues in possession by leasing back the asset from the 
buyer. The up-front infusion of cash to the seller, coupled with a periodic payment obligation by 
the seller, resembles in many respects a traditional loan. See Ronald A. Morris, Sale-Leaseback 
Transactions of Real Property—A Proposal, 30 TAX LAW. 701, 701 (1977) (describing some 
versions of the sale-leaseback as “disguised loans”). 
 63. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“The State can no more abdicate its 
trust over property in which the whole people are interested . . . than it can abdicate its police 
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”). 
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on judicial assistance to evict government tenants or public users—or 
that a creditor would want to put himself in the position of having to 
do so. Moreover, structured transactions carry significant transaction 
costs and appeal to a relatively narrow lender market. They raise 
difficult problems of valuation and therefore graft.64 
B. Tax-Credit Borrowing as Risk-Free Debt 
This Article introduces tax-credit borrowing as a mechanism by 
which states can circumvent sovereign immunity and create risk-free 
debt. The most straightforward example of what I have in mind is the 
tax-credit bond. A tax-credit bond is identical in most respects to a 
traditional bond. In exchange for an investor’s up-front contribution, 
the state promises to repay principal plus a stated interest rate at the 
bond’s maturity. Maturity and interest rates are determined by 
market conditions and state and investor preferences. Depending on 
the bond’s terms, repayment can be made periodically, with so-called 
coupon payments, or can be made in a lump sum at maturity. The 
bonds are freely alienable, and a vigorous secondary market may 
emerge to reduce the transaction costs of transfer and therefore the 
cost of borrowing. 
The lone difference is the form of the state’s repayment. A 
traditional bond is a demand on the treasury to cut a check for the 
specified amount at maturity (or periodically, in the case of a coupon-
bearing bond). A tax-credit bond, by contrast, entitles the holder to 
deduct the agreed amount from her tax bill. Imagine a traditional 
bond purchased today for $100. It represents a promise by the state to 
pay $120 in ten years’ time. In a decade, the holder—who may or may 
not have been the initial purchaser—may redeem the bond for a 
check. The $120 payment can be understood as the return of $100 in 
principal and $20 of interest, itself comprising a combination of the 
time-value of $100 and the risk to the holder of the state’s default. A 
corresponding tax-credit bond entitles the holder not to a check, but 
to an offset of $120 to the taxes and fees she would otherwise owe the 
state.65 
 
 64. For another variation on the theme, see Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax 
Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1965, 2002–06 (2011). 
 65. I use this figure by way of illustration only. In practice, the amount a state would pay on 
a $100 tax-credit bond would be less than on a traditional bond of the same denomination. See 
infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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Tax-credit bonds have been little used in American history, but 
they have some precedent. During the Civil War, West Virginia was 
created out of the northwestern third of what was then the 
Commonwealth of Virginia.66 The Old Dominion was relieved of its 
war debt, but was still obliged on $30,000,000 in bonds it had issued to 
fund general improvements. After the War, the Virginians held that 
West Virginia should assume a share of the debt proportional to its 
land mass.67 To effect their vision, the legislature enacted the Funding 
Act of 1871.68 The Act authorized bondholders to redeem their bonds 
for two newly issued instruments: (1) a certificate entitling the holder 
to a share of any settlement with West Virginia (representing one-
third of the initial bond’s nominal value), and (2) a newly issued 
Virginia bond (representing two-thirds of the initial bond’s value).69 
To alleviate fear of repudiation, and thus encourage redemption on 
its terms, the Commonwealth allowed the coupons associated with its 
replacement bonds to be set off against the holder’s taxes. In the 
language of the statute, the coupons were made “receivable at and 
after maturity for all taxes, debts, dues, and demands due the state.”70 
Under Virginia’s scheme, only the coupons (and not the principal) 
could be used to offset a holder’s tax liability. But the intuition 
underlying the offset could be generalized to extend to principal. 
At least since the mid-1990s, federal legislation has also seen a 
tax-credit borrowing scheme put to use, although in a different 
context and for a quite different purpose than this Article advocates. 
In 1997, Congress authorized state and local governments to issue 
$400,000,000 per year of what it dubbed “qualified zone academy 
bonds” (QZABs).71 These QZABs, which granted the bearer an 
offset to her federal taxes, could be issued to support infrastructure 
development and other spending on presecondary schools for 
children of low-income families.72 The details are unimportant here. 
 
 66. For a fuller account of the history of Virginia’s tax-credit-borrowing plan, see John V. 
Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 1798–1908: A Case Study of Judicial 
Power, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 439–47 (1983); Pomeroy, supra note 41, at 694–99. 
 67. Orth, supra note 66, at 439. 
 68. Funding Act of 1871, ch. 282, 1870–71 Va. Acts 378.  
 69. Id. §§ 2–3.  
 70. Id. § 2. The very next year, Virginia did in fact try to repudiate the tax-credit coupons. 
For more on that, see infra notes 89–102 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1397E, 111 Stat. 788, 821–24 
(1997) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1397E). 
 72. Id. 
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The point is that these tax-credit bonds were employed as a federal 
subsidy of congressionally preferred state and local activities. 
Following the QZABs came a series of statutes authorizing the 
issuance of the following tax-credit bonds to subsidize congressionally 
favored activities: Clean Renewable Energy Bonds,73 Gulf Tax Credit 
Bonds,74 Qualified Forestry Conservation Bonds,75 Qualified Energy 
Conservation Bonds,76 Midwestern Disaster Area Bonds,77 and, most 
recently, under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, Qualified School Construction Bonds, Build America Bonds, 
and Recovery Zone Economic Development Bonds.78 
The recent federal incarnations of tax-credit borrowing suggest 
that investors would be receptive to tax-credit bonds at the state level, 
à la the Virginia prototype. Proceeds from their sale would not be 
earmarked for particular objects of federal largesse, but could be used 
for general state purposes. 
The logic of using tax-credit bonds to create superpriority, risk-
free debt stems from the Supreme Court’s understanding of sovereign 
immunity. In particular, it relies on the procedural distinction 
between plaintiff and defendant. The courts will not hear a private 
plaintiff’s claim for damages against a state,79 but they will reject a 
state’s claim against a private party according to the merits of the 
defense. This is because sovereign immunity goes to the availability of 
a remedy, not the existence of a substantive right.80 To realists it is 
 
 73. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1303, 119 Stat. 594, 992–96 (2005) 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
343, § 107, 122 Stat. 3765, 3817–19 (2008) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54C).  
 74. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, § 15316, 122 Stat. 2577, 2589–
93 (2005) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54B). 
 75. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 301, 122 Stat. 1651, 
2271–74 (2008) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54D). 
 76. Id. § 301, 122 Stat. at 3841–44. 
 77. Id. § 702, 122 Stat. at 3912–18. 
 78. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 1521, 1531, 
1400U-2, 123 Stat. 115, 349–50 (2009) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1400U-2). 
 79. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667–74 (1974).  
 80. This principle was, for example, at the center of the decision in Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123, 149 (1908) (“The question that arises is whether there is a remedy that the parties 
interested may resort to, by going into a Federal court of equity, in a case involving a violation 
of the Federal Constitution . . . .”). For a thorough explanation of the decision’s logic, see John 
Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 996 (2008) (“But while the State was for 
practical purposes a party, it was not so in a way that violated the principle of sovereign 
immunity. Because the plaintiffs sought an anti-suit injunction that would enforce a defense 
against the state, the suit in which Minnesota was in substance a party was also one in which 
Minnesota was in substance the plaintiff and the railroads were the defendants. Asserting a 
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something of a puzzle why permitting a claim is more offensive to a 
state’s dignity and sovereignty than is sustaining a defense. But 
doctrinally the difference is critical. When a state invokes the courts 
to resolve its claims against a private party, the defendant is justified 
in raising any defense she would otherwise have on the merits. 
For the holder of a traditional bond, the remedy against a 
recalcitrant state is the very suit for money damages that sovereign 
immunity blocks. Redeeming a tax-credit bond, on the other hand, 
requires no judicial aid. All the tax-credit bondholder must do is 
claim the bond’s value as an offset to taxes otherwise owed. If the 
issuing state wished to repudiate its obligation, it would need to sue 
the holder for underpayment of taxes.81 This suit would grant the 
holder a judicial forum in which she could assert her right to the 
offset as a matter of contract. 
In court, the redeemer would have a straightforward defense. 
The tax-credit bond represents a binding contract that the state may 
not impair consistent with the Contract Clause.82 In this setting the 
judgment in Faitoute is inapplicable. Faitoute was premised on the 
Justices’ conclusion that in practical terms, the bondholders were in a 
better position after “impairment” than they would have been absent 
New Jersey’s legislative action.83 The bondholders enjoyed only a 
“paper” right to relief.84 And the price of the relevant bonds had 
indeed increased after the state altered their terms.85 Thus, in the 
Justices’ view, the bondholders had little to complain about. In this 
 
defense against a government does not offend its sovereign immunity.”); id. at 1000 (“The 
railroads in Perkins were thus using a familiar mode of proceeding by which a potential 
defendant at law could sue in equity and present a legal position that would be a defense at law. 
Because their position was a defense, not an affirmative claim on the State of Minnesota, a court 
could grant relief without offending sovereign immunity.”). 
 81. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (forbidding the taking of property without “due 
process of law”). 
 82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (providing that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts”). The federal nature of the Contract Clause defense 
supplies the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to review any state court decision rejecting it. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2012) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State 
in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari 
where . . . the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being 
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States . . . .”). Thus, even if the 
state were to sue the redeemer in a favorable tribunal—before, say, elected judges sharing the 
legislature’s view of the political merits of repudiation—the redeemer could ultimately find 
redress in federal court. 
 83. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1942).  
 84. Id. at 516. 
 85. Id. at 513. 
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sense Faitoute can be read to validate parties’ pragmatic resolution of 
a well-known holdout problem in multilateral restructurings. Perhaps 
the decision could even support a state’s unilateral restructuring of 
traditional debt obligations, were the case somehow to reach federal 
court.86 
But the situation is quite different in the case of a state wishing 
to repudiate a tax-credit bond. The holder of such a bond enjoys 
more than a “paper” right. Her right to payment, in the form of an 
offset, is self-executing upon redemption. Any attempt by the state to 
shortchange the bondholder would represent a practical as well as 
theoretical impairment.87 The skepticism with which the Court has 
generally viewed state attempts to alter their own contracts would 
seem paramount. A quarter century after Faitoute, for example, the 
Justices neatly summarized the vision animating Contract Clause 
jurisprudence in this domain: a state “cannot refuse to meet its 
legitimate financial obligations simply because it would prefer to 
spend the money to promote the public good than the private welfare 
of its creditors.”88 
This understanding of sovereign immunity’s implications for tax-
credit borrowing was put to the test, and confirmed, when Virginia 
sought to repudiate its tax-credit coupons in the late nineteenth 
century. Shortly after Virginia enacted the Funding Act of 1871,89 a 
group of politicians called the “Readjusters” came to power in 
Richmond.90 The Readjusters sought to repudiate the tax-credit 
coupons issued to resolve Virginia’s antebellum debts.91 They enacted 
a series of laws, known as “coupon killers,” that aimed to destroy the 
financial value of the Commonwealth’s obligations, if not the 
 
 86. Such anyway is the supposition of Hynes, supra note 10, at 681–82. 
 87. One qualification is worth noting. Although a state cannot default directly, clever 
legislators might seek to do so underhandedly. Rather than deny the effect of the bond itself, 
the state could impose a separate tax on bondholders or those who redeem bonds. This would 
practically cancel the bonds’ effectiveness. The courts might be expected to lump such 
legislation together with the bond promise and hold it void under the Contract Clause. But as a 
matter of prudence, tax-credit bonds could include a promise by the state not to impose a 
discriminatory tax on account of the holder’s possession or redemption. This sort of promise 
would itself form part of the “Obligation of Contract[]” beyond the state’s power to impair. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 88. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977). 
 89. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 90. Orth, supra note 66, at 440–41. 
 91. Id. 
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obligations themselves.92 The most prominent and direct effort was a 
statute barring tax collectors from accepting the coupons in payment 
of taxes.93 The act declared that only gold, silver, U.S. Treasury notes, 
and national-bank notes would be receivable in payment of debts 
owed to the Commonwealth.94 
The validity of this attempt at repudiation came to a head in the 
Supreme Court in 1885, in what are known as the Virginia Coupon 
Cases.95 The basic fact pattern of these cases is simple enough. A 
bondholder tendered coupons to the taxman and was rebuffed.96 The 
tax collector then levied on the bondholder’s assets for 
underpayment, and this decision set the stage for an action in detinue 
by the bondholder.97 The merits of the detinue action turned on 
whether the bondholder was in fact delinquent in paying his taxes.98 
The Court held, first, that federal jurisdiction existed because the 
actions were not suits against the state for purposes of sovereign 
immunity;99 and, second, that the Constitution invalidated Virginia’s 
law purporting to strip the coupons of their value as tax credit.100 
Whatever a state’s machinations, the Court insisted that a bond 
permitting the holder to offset taxes would be enforced: 
The contract with Virginia was not only that the coupons should be 
received in payment of taxes, but, by necessary implication, that the 
tax-payer making such a tender should not be molested further, as 
though he were a delinquent, and that for every illegal attempt 
subsequently to enforce the collection of the tax, by the seizure of 
property, he should have remedies of the law in force when the 
contract was made, for redress, or others equally effective.101 
The Coupon Cases did not end Virginia’s attempts to repudiate its 
tax-credit obligations. But in each instance, before and after Hans, 
 
 92. For a discussion of Virginia’s attempts to repudiate, see id. at 439–47. 
 93. Id. at 440.  
 94. Id. at 442.  
 95. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885). For an account of legal wrangling over the 
Virginia scheme before and after the Coupon Cases, see Orth, supra note 66, at 439–47.  
 96. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. at 273. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 308. 
 99. Id. at 288. 
 100. Id. at 303–04. 
 101. Id. 
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the Supreme Court held the line.102 For purposes of sovereign 
immunity, tax-credit borrowing works differently from traditional 
modes of state borrowing. 
Thoughtful readers might question whether the result in the 
Coupon Cases would hold today, eighty years after Home Building & 
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell103 held that the financial emergency associated 
with the Great Depression justified state interference with 
contractual obligations.104 But although the cases following Blaisdell 
have undoubtedly empowered states to interfere with contracts to a 
greater extent than they could have in the nineteenth century, little in 
the development of Contract Clause jurisprudence would seem to 
undermine the Coupon Cases. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that state attempts to impair contracts to which they themselves 
are a party should be viewed skeptically.105 
Thus, tax-credit borrowing has the capacity to create something 
approaching risk-free debt. In the first analysis, the superior 
credibility of tax-credit borrowing can reduce a state’s borrowing 
costs. Return to the example presented above: a bond selling for $100 
and obliging the state to pay $120 in ten years’ time. The nominal $20 
benefit to the lender represents the sum of the time-value of the 
lender’s money and a premium corresponding to the presumed risk of 
the state’s default. Suppose the time-value component came to $18. 
 
 102. One contemporary account summarized the controversy and the line of cases before 
and after 1885 this way:  
New bonds were issued, the State contracting that the coupons annexed should be 
receivable for all taxes. For twenty-seven years this legislation has been upheld, 
except as to one sort of tax, which under the Constitution of Virginia was payable 
only in specie. But during all that time the legislature has done its best to impair the 
State’s agreement. A statute was passed in 1887 providing that only gold, silver, 
United States treasury notes, and national bank notes, were receivable for taxes; and 
by virtue of this statute the present plaintiff was refused relief when he took the 
proper steps to obtain credit, in payment of taxes, for the coupons which he held. The 
highest court of the State held the entire coupon agreement unconstitutional, the 
whole vitiated by the part which was formerly held invalid. It was urged that the 
Supreme Court could not review this decision; but the court has taken the other view, 
reversed the judgment of the Virginia court, held the funding contract valid, and 
decided that it is impaired by the later statute.  
Note, Another Virginia Coupon Case, 12 HARV. L. REV. 421, 421 (1899); see David P. Currie, 
Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 149, 152–54 
(1984); Orth, supra note 66, at 439–47 (summarizing the Virginia Coupon Cases). 
 103. Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 104. Id. at 437. 
 105. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 505 (1987); U.S. Trust 
Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977); see also Brenner M. Fissell, Note, The Dual 
Standard of Review in Contracts Clause Jurisprudence, 101 GEO. L.J. 1089, 1091–93 (2013) 
(describing the “stricter standard” applied to self-interested states). 
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(That is, an analogous U.S. Treasury bond, usually thought to 
approximate risk-free debt, would pay $118.) With a tax-credit bond 
the default premium would shrink to something approaching zero. To 
raise $100 today, holding all else equal, the state would need to 
promise only $118 in a decade rather than $120. 
To capture this intuition, it may be helpful to think of tax-credit 
borrowing as a species of the “toggling” transactions that permeate 
commercial relationships. The logic of tax-credit borrowing is to 
increase the value of a substantive promise—the obligation to 
repay—by inverting traditional procedural roles to enhance the 
promisee’s certainty. It is a way for parties to opt out of seemingly 
fixed legal rules of procedure in order to maximize their joint surplus. 
The ancient institution of the pawn shop is a good illustration of 
this kind of toggling. X wants to borrow from Y and is willing to pay a 
competitive interest rate. X is trustworthy, but his trustworthiness is 
not observable to Y. Y consults her lawyer and learns that recovery in 
the event of X’s breach is costly. If X defaults, Y must file an action, 
obtain a judgment (by default or otherwise), find X’s assets, and then 
levy upon them. Execution may prove too expensive even assuming 
that X has assets. X, too, knows that legal process may not be worth 
the candle to Y, and his knowledge reduces his credibility even 
further in Y’s eyes. The expense of civil procedure threatens to 
prevent X from demonstrating his credibility; thus, collateral is born. 
X gives Y possession of his prized guitar. Now, in case of default, Y 
need not resort to costly procedures that both parties know will have 
little if any net value to her. She may simply foreclose. If there is a 
dispute about X’s right to the guitar, X must now sue Y. The toggle is 
complete. 
Tax-credit borrowing has the capacity to reduce borrowing costs 
just as pawning does. Its broader significance for state fiscal policy 
turns, however, on the specifics of its use and on the dynamics of state 
political economy. Tax-credit borrowing reduces the cost of debt 
because it precludes default. This does not mean it precludes financial 
distress. Rather, it shifts the incidence of distress away from the 
creditor and toward a state’s other constituents. Whether such a shift 
is normatively preferable depends on, among other things, its 
expected effects on state financial decisions—states’ borrowing as 
well as taxing and spending policies. 
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C. Practical Obstacles 
The limited American experience with tax-credit borrowing 
suggests that it is a viable form of financing state expenditures, at 
least on a small scale. But it is fair to ask whether the scope of tax-
credit borrowing could ever be wide enough to have a significant 
impact on a state’s political economy; and, if it could, why tax-credit 
borrowing has been so rare historically. This Part considers three of 
the keenest practical objections: insufficient liquidity in secondary 
markets, federal tax policy, and the tradability of pension obligations. 
1. Insufficient Liquidity in Secondary Markets.  One criticism of 
tax-credit borrowing is that the secondary market for tax credits may 
not be robust enough to support large issuances of tax-credit bonds. 
A secondary market is critical. There is no particular reason to think 
that the initial buyers of a state’s tax credits will themselves be able to 
use all of the offset rights they receive in exchange for lending. A 
creditor may not expect her future tax bills to exceed the face value of 
her offsets. She might expect little future income, for example; she 
might not own much taxable property; she might move to a different 
state. Surely the prospect that credits would go to waste would 
undermine lenders’ incentive to accept an offset right in lieu of cash. 
Secondary markets in traditional state and municipal bonds are 
highly liquid and efficient. Even in 1972, William Staats, of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, was able to write that 
“[c]ommunications networks enable sellers to exhibit bonds 
throughout the Nation in less than 3 hours. Large or small blocks of 
bonds of various maturities—whether issued by well-known or quite 
obscure government entities—may be sold through the secondary 
market . . . .”106 Since then, transaction costs have only diminished.107 
But unlike traditional bonds, tax-credit bonds hold intrinsic value 
only to the extent that market participants expect to owe taxes to the 
issuing state. Those who expect to pay such taxes will value a tax-
credit bond at just below face value at the time of maturity, but such 
 
 106. William F. Staats, The Secondary Market for State and Local Government Bonds, in 3 
REAPPRAISAL OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE DISCOUNT MECHANISM 3 (1972), available at 
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/federal%20reserve%20history/discountmech/bog_rea
ppraisal_discount_197108_vol3.pdf. 
 107. See Lawrence E. Harris & Michael S. Piwowar, Secondary Trading Costs in the 
Municipal Bond Market, 61 J. FIN. 1361, 1363–64 (2006) (noting that municipal-bond trading 
may be more efficient because it is not subject to particular trading hours and because web-
based trading has become prevalent). 
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taxpayers represent only a fraction of debt-market participants. 
Viable secondary markets for the tax-credit bonds of the most 
populous states are sure to develop. But what about markets for the 
bonds of low-population states with small tax bases, such as Wyoming 
or Alaska? 
There are at least two plausible lines of response. The first is 
convertibility. A state could issue bonds promising to pay a specified 
amount from the state treasury, but granting the holder an option to 
convert the obligation into a tax credit. This was the approach 
Virginia took with its tax-credit coupons in the nineteenth century.108 
The value of the option to convert—that is, the discount at which tax-
credit bonds trade relative to traditional bonds—would represent the 
market’s view of the expected cost of repudiation to the traditional 
bondholder. For an especially solvent and “trustworthy” state, the 
option would be worth very little: the difference between tax-credit 
borrowing and traditional borrowing would be negligible. In other 
words, debt-market participants would value convertible instruments 
much as they would any other bond in financially stable times. Only 
in periods of financial distress would the pool of willing buyers 
shrink.109 But to the extent tax-credit borrowing can be expected to 
reduce the ratio of a state’s borrowing to revenue,110 the process of 
issuing these bonds could itself mitigate the liquidity problem. 
Alternatively (or additionally), smaller-population states might 
consider an interstate compact to develop a nationwide secondary 
market. To illustrate, Oregon could promise to honor the tax credits 
associated with bonds issued by New Jersey. The states would then 
net out their mutual obligations at an agreed date. This kind of 
reciprocity agreement would be enforceable in federal court—the 
federal judicial power extends “to Controversies between two or 
more States.”111 After all, the right sought to be enforced would be a 
 
 108. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
 109. As the risk of repudiation increases, so too does the probability that a holder will opt to 
convert. It is the act of conversion—or, rather, the likelihood of conversion—that could drive 
investors out of the market for these bonds. Ironically, to the extent a viable secondary market 
could be sustained, it is precisely during periods of financial distress that the spread between a 
traditional bond and a convertible bond will be greatest. 
 110. See infra notes 192–95 and accompanying text. 
 111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Moreover, an action to settle up would not seem to implicate 
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88–91 (1883), which holds that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars a debt action by one state against another where the plaintiff state seeks to 
enforce a right properly belonging to its citizens. 
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right of the plaintiff state in the first instance, not one derived from or 
assigned by one of its citizens. 
2. Federal Tax Policy.  In some measure, federal legislation is 
probably needed to spur tax-credit borrowing. At a minimum, the 
Tax Code would need to be amended to undo what is in effect a 
relative subsidy of traditional bond borrowing. Section 103 of the Tax 
Code excludes from gross income the interest a taxpayer earns on 
most state and municipal bonds.112 No corresponding provision 
excludes the interest “income” a tax-credit bond provides in the form 
of reduced tax liability. This means that the holder of a traditional 
bond receives more after-tax benefit than does the holder of an 
otherwise identical tax-credit bond.113 To achieve parity under the 
existing regime and so as to attract investor interest, states would 
have to offer a higher rate of return on tax-credit bonds, something 
they plainly have no interest in doing.114 
3. Tradability of Pension Obligations.  A related obstacle turns 
on the realistic scope of tax-credit borrowing. It would be easy 
enough to replace traditional bonds with tax-credit bonds; the 
plausibility of that change should not provoke much quarrel. But, a 
critic might say, bonds comprise only a part of state borrowing.115 
States “borrow” far more from workers, the repayment obligations 
taking the form of pension and other retirement benefits.116 Unlike 
with bonds, the extent of the state’s pension obligation to any 
particular employee depends on a host of factors not easily 
determined until that employee retires. Seniority, peak salary, age at 
 
 112. 26 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 113. Issuing convertible instruments would reduce the tax disadvantage imposed by § 103 
because, when the issuing state is financially healthy, bondholders can be expected simply to 
receive interest payments as they do with respect to a traditional bond. 
 114. At an assumed tax rate of 35 percent, the after-tax yield of a traditional bond is more 
than 50 percent greater than that of a nominally identical tax-credit bond. To attract investors to 
the tax-credit bond under the current regime, states would have to offer a correspondingly 
higher interest rate. 
 115. See ANDREW ANG & RICHARD C. GREEN, LOWERING BORROWING COSTS FOR 
STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES THROUGH COMMONMUNI 33 (2011), available at 
https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/aang/papers/THP%20ANG-GREEN%20DiscusPape
_Feb2011.pdf (“Assets in state pension plans total less than $2.0 trillion at the same date and, 
thus, Novy-Marx and Rauh estimate the underfunding of state pension plans to be 
approximately $3.2 trillion. In comparison, the outstanding publicly traded debt issued by states 
is approximately only $1 trillion.”).  
 116. See, e.g., Skeel, Is Bankruptcy, supra note 10, at 1072–73.  
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retirement, and other uncertain determinants mean that the state’s 
debt is indefinite in the year that credit (that is, labor) is supplied. No 
obviously fungible instrument can be issued to, say, a twenty-five-
year-old employee. At retirement, to be sure, the state could issue 
certificates specifying the periodic (convertible?) tax credit to which 
the retiree is entitled; these would seem amenable to trade. But a 
potential difficulty arises if, by the time of an employee’s retirement, 
the obligor state faces financial difficulty and refuses to issue the 
certificate to which the employee is entitled. 
Whether this is a real problem turns on the propriety of a 
mandamus remedy.117 In one sense, a mandamus petition for the 
issuance of a pension certificate could be thought to aim directly at 
the state’s treasury in a manner that sovereign immunity precludes. 
The reason for the petition is of course to deprive the state of 
revenue. Yet this is probably not the most persuasive way to 
understand such a remedy.118 Mandamus would not formally turn on 
an entitlement to the state’s funds. It would rather seek to require a 
public official to deliver documentation of a right—the right to a 
specific pension amount—that is not itself questioned.119  
II.  THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE STATE DEBT 
Many states today are in the red, and by no small amount. 
Depending on one’s assumptions, pension shortfalls alone account for 
between roughly one and three trillion dollars of debt.120 The share of 
the GDP devoted to servicing current obligations is growing.121 One 
should not fall prey to hindsight bias and conclude in every case of 
financial distress that the level of borrowing was superoptimal when 
viewed ex ante. The world is probabilistic, and sometimes debt 
 
 117. For a discussion of the effect of sovereign immunity on the feasibility of a mandamus 
remedy against the state, see supra Part I.A. 
 118. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 (1974) (explaining that a suit for injunctive 
relief against a state actor is not barred simply because the relief will have an effect on the state 
treasury). 
 119. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167–70 (1803) (holding that mandamus 
against a state actor is an appropriate remedy, although not within the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction, for a state actor’s refusal to deliver documentation of petitioner’s legal right). 
 120. See, e.g., Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, Public Pension Promises: How Big Are 
They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211, 1213 (2011) (reporting aggregate 
underfunding of accrued pension liabilities, as of June 2009, at between $1.26 trillion and $2.49 
trillion); Mary Williams Walsh, Ratings Service Finds Pension Shortfall, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 
2013, at B1 (reporting an estimated $980 billion shortfall). 
 121. For a summary, see Cooper & Walsh, supra note 5. 
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burdens that seem reasonable when incurred turn out to be 
unsustainable. But there is little doubt that in recent decades some 
states have borrowed, and are now borrowing, far too much. 
Appropriate terminology should be used here. How much debt is 
“just right” depends on deeply contested normative views of 
government’s role, the appropriate discount rate to apply to the 
future, and similar factors. Ultimately the standard one chooses is of 
little importance to this Article’s central themes. But it may be worth 
positing a definition of excessive debt that will focus some of the 
analysis that follows. I have in mind debt that results in socially 
wasteful spending—projects that the polity, however defined, values 
at less than cost. If for whatever reason the person or persons who 
make spending decisions take less than full account of the cost of 
spending, then the state will spend on wasteful projects by forcing 
others to pay a share of the price. Debt is just such a way to 
externalize costs. (By contrast, a state borrows too little if it cannot 
fund positive-value projects, the costs of which are borne by current 
taxpayers but the benefits of which extend to future or foreign 
residents.) 
This Part explores the leading explanations of excessive state 
debt. Scholars have identified two principal, competing theories: the 
incentive of a state, understood as a collective entity, to externalize 
financial risk onto residents of other states; and the difficulty a state’s 
residents experience in monitoring political actors who may find it in 
their personal interest to fund current spending projects with future 
payment obligations. Parts III and IV will consider the impact tax-
credit borrowing might have on these problems. 
A. Risk Externalization 
As it applies to the states, risk externalization refers to the 
tendency of a state to push some of the expected cost of debt 
repayment onto the residents of other states, typically by seeking 
federal aid. On this view, states systematically overborrow as they try 
to impose the losses associated with bad fiscal conditions on sister 
states through the use of federal-government resources. Lenders, 
whether they be bond buyers, trade creditors, or employees, charge 
the state for its leverage,122 but they charge less than they would 
absent the possibility of federal assistance. The joint surplus of the 
 
 122. And the empirical evidence shows that lenders do adjust prices as a state becomes 
more or less likely to default. See Rodden, supra note 20, at 128. 
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state and its creditors is maximized by shifting some of the cost of 
debt. Thus, the state borrows more than it would if a federal backstop 
were unavailable. 
An analogy to corporate law may help clarify the intuition. It is 
hornbook law that corporations enjoy limited liability. The 
significance of this doctrine is straightforward: creditors are out of 
luck if the value of corporate assets cannot fully compensate them; 
they may not demand that shareholders make them whole. As a 
consequence, shareholders, and presumably the managers who 
represent them, do not fully weigh the probable costs of the firm’s 
activities. Their private loss is capped at the amount of investment, 
but the potential public injury is not. Scholars have long attacked 
limited liability on the ground that it encourages inefficiently risky 
projects, the downside costs of which are borne by involuntary 
creditors (for example, tort victims123). And it is this very concern that 
underlies bonding requirements in some industries as well as the 
familiar rules of corporate-veil piercing. The aim of such policies is to 
force corporate decisionmakers to internalize the expected costs, as 
well as the benefits, of the risks they undertake. 
Unlike private firms, states cannot externalize financial risk by 
operation of law. They rely on positive action from the federal 
government, whether in the form of congressional appropriation or 
discretionary spending by the executive. But why would the federal 
government assist a financially distressed state, especially since doing 
so would tend to exacerbate moral hazard? There are two general 
rationales: economic self-interest and sympathetic identification. 
The self-interest story begins with the intimate economic 
relationship of states in a fiscal federation such as the United States.124 
 
 123. E.g., David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1565, 1565 n.4 (1991) (collecting sources); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and 
Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 128–29 (1991) (“Maybe limited liability should 
be denied to firms that adopt limited liability only with respect to tort creditors or that have less 
than a minimal amount of capitalization or insurance.”); see generally Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 
1879 (1991) (comparing the consequences of limited and unlimited liability for corporations). 
 124. To be clear, it is the degree of correlation of states’ economies that matters for this 
purpose, not their formal status as members of a fiscal federation. See generally Stephen J. Choi, 
Mitu Gulati & Eric Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 131 (2012) (generalizing reasons why, in the sovereign context, third-party countries 
may bail out debtors). Yet because the economies of federal members tend to be more linked 
than, say, the economies of New Zealand and Hungary, the threat of externalization looms 
largest in the context of a fiscal federation. 
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When states’ economic lives are closely intertwined, one state’s 
default—and even uncertainty regarding the possibility of its 
default—can ripple through the broader economy. The economic 
depression associated with massive debt obligations reduces wealth in 
the affected state, and therefore reduces demand by the state’s 
residents for the goods and services produced in other states. 
Imagine, for example, that California’s forty million citizens suddenly 
stopped buying products from the rest of the country. It would 
devastate industry far beyond state lines, and the multiplier effect 
could wreak havoc. This is an unrealistically extreme example, of 
course, but it grimly illustrates the spillover effects of financial 
distress. Contagion more narrowly defined is also a threat. If a state’s 
default were to fall particularly hard on a certain class of creditor—
say, financial institutions—then the effect could ripple quickly 
through the economy. Thus, when one state’s default seems possible, 
it may be in the nation’s interest to intervene with assistance. Indeed, 
federal governments struggle greatly not to provide assistance when 
doing so would avoid a greater calamity.125 
There is reason to doubt how serious of an issue contagion really 
is in the state–federal context. If, for example, a state’s debt were held 
by its own citizens in proportion to income, then a default would 
accomplish precisely the same thing as a tax increase. The likelihood 
of contagion is an empirical question, the resolution of which is 
beyond this Article’s scope. But in any event, the important question 
for assessing federal incentives is not how contagious states’ default 
ought to be as a matter of economic theory. It is how markets will 
react on this score—and the risk of a bad reaction may itself supply a 
reason to intervene. 
A less rigorous, yet perhaps equally important, explanation for 
risk externalization is simple fellow feeling. One does not like to see 
one’s countrymen suffering, especially if those suffering do not 
appear immediately at fault. At a general level this explanation has 
nothing to do with debt per se. Think of the popularity of federal 
disaster-relief programs. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the federal 
government partially insures victims of natural disaster.126 
 
 125. See Levitin, supra note 10, at 499 (observing that “when scared, governments bail, as 
shown by the United States in 1992 (bailing out Mexico absent authority), the United States in 
2008 (stretching section 13(3) authority), and the European Union in 2010 (bailing out Greece 
despite a no-bailouts clause in the E.U. Treaty)”). 
 126. Howard Kunreuther, Disaster Mitigation and Insurance: Learning from Katrina, 604 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 208, 214–16 (2006).  
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Catastrophic damage is often seen as an act of God, even though it is 
widely known that the probability of natural disaster is much greater 
in some regions of the country than in others.127 This insurance gives 
rise to moral hazard, leading to greater-than-optimal investment in 
disaster-prone areas, and represents a form of risk externalization. A 
similar dynamic is at play in calls to help “blameless” communities 
facing crushing debt.128 
Self-interest and pity are cumulative, and it is some admixture of 
the two that explains the federal urge to bail out heavily indebted 
states. The empirical significance of risk externalization is 
unfortunately difficult to test. For one thing, it is no small matter even 
to agree on when a “bailout” has happened. The responsible political 
actors are unlikely to label their actions as such. Relief may not be 
directed immediately to creditors. Instead, it will more likely be 
packaged as assistance to a community—to local industry or to 
individual residents. In 2013, Detroit’s emergency manager declared 
that he would not seek federal dollars to pay off creditors, but that 
the city would need special assistance to tear down dilapidated 
buildings.129 Because money is fungible, this is an economically 
irrelevant distinction. The question is simply whether a jurisdiction 
and its creditors, viewed as a joint enterprise, are able to extract more 
cash from the federal treasury than they would otherwise be entitled 
to. Yet rhetorical ambiguities make the problem a difficult one to 
study. 
It is also important to keep in mind that even with the possibility 
of a federal bailout, traditional creditors will respond to a state’s 
financial distress by lobbying for concessions (that is, revenue 
increases or spending cuts). Federal assistance is unlikely to make 
creditors whole; creditors would prefer that the state pay in full. The 
 
 127. Where to Live to Avoid a Natural Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/01/weekinreview/01safe.html (reporting that residents of 
Corvallis, Oregon, face the smallest risk, and that Dallas, Texas, is most prone to natural 
disaster).  
 128. Consider in this regard the recent reports from Detroit that 911 calls are typically 
unanswered for an hour, notwithstanding that the city is sitting on billions of dollars of art. See 
Lisa Lambert, ‘No Bailout’: Senators Look To Pre-empt U.S. Aid to Detroit, REUTERS, July 25, 
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/25/us-usa-detroit-congress-idUSBRE
96O1DO20130725; Kim Peterson, A 911 Response in Detroit Takes How Long?, MSN (July 9, 
2013, 1:52 PM), http://money.msn.com/now/post--a-911-response-in-detroit-takes-how-long. 
 129. Jonathan Oosting, Michigan Approved for $100 Million in Federal Funding to Demolish 
Blighted Homes in 5 Cities, MLIVE, June 6, 2013 (4:27 PM, updated June 6, 2013, 7:17 PM), 
www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/06/michigan_100_million_demolitio.html. 
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extent of a state’s apparent moral hazard will thus turn in part on the 
political power of creditors. Consider, for example, the largely foreign 
creditors who bore the brunt of state defaults in the 1840s.130 They 
were unable to exert the influence needed to right the ship before it 
was too late. A very different picture emerges if some or all creditors 
are effective political operators. Could public-employee unions be 
such a class? The jury is out. 
Whatever the exact empirical significance of risk externalization, 
many thoughtful observers believe it to be a significant factor in state-
debt levels. As Professor Clayton Gillette observes, “Credit markets 
likely apply a positive value to the probability of a federal bailout of 
states, just as they applied a positive value to the probability of a 
federal bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, notwithstanding the 
absence of any legal obligation.”131 And recent calls for explicit 
federal bond insurance, an indirect cross-subsidy of the most 
imprudent states by the most prudent ones, suggest that Gillette is 
right.132 
The federal backstop puts a floor on the damage a member state 
can expect to bear in bad fiscal conditions. As a consequence, a given 
state’s activities reflect a greater appetite for risk than they otherwise 
would. The state’s potential creditors see the same dynamic, and in 
response charge the state lower interest rates than its default risk 
would otherwise justify. Neither the state nor its creditors want 
economic turmoil, of course; all do better if the economy remains 
vital. Yet as a group they maximize their joint surplus by increasing 
state debt and, therefore, the risk of a calamitous default in the first 
instance. 
To be sure, federal intervention is no certainty. And it is unlikely 
to make state creditors whole or to come without strings attached. 
The state-debt markets clearly reflect the heterogeneity of risk posed 
by investment in the various states.133 The point is not that states and 
 
 130. William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State 
Debts in the 1840’s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259, 261 (1996). 
 131. Clayton P. Gillette, Political Will and Fiscal Federalism in Municipal Bankruptcy 52 
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-22, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793173.  
 132. See, e.g., Richard J. Riordan & Tim Rutten, Op-Ed., A Plan to Avert the Pension Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013, at A17 (arguing that the federal government should intervene and 
bail out Detroit). 
 133. See Rodden, supra note 20, at 137 (commenting on credit-default-swap prices after 
2008). 
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their creditors fully externalize risk, only that they may do so on the 
margins and to a degree that significantly affects state policy. 
B. Agency Problems 
A competing, though complementary, suite of theories explains 
overborrowing as a consequence of political dysfunction within a 
state. Although the details of these theories vary, they share a 
fundamental premise: that elected representatives find it in their self-
interest to borrow excessively to fund current expenditures. These 
theories depend on a corollary view that the polity does a poor job of 
disciplining political actors who take on debt to pay for projects that 
the polity, as a whole, values below cost. 
A vast literature, dating at least to Adam Smith, explains why 
incumbent politicians are often willing to eat the seed corn, spending 
today on popular projects while seeking to pay for them tomorrow.134 
More recent theorists have set out a number of rationales to explain 
why elected representatives might choose to fund current spending 
with debt rather than with tax revenue. Imagine, for example, an 
incumbent who anticipates that his spending priorities will differ from 
those of his successors.135 Such an incumbent may want to borrow in 
the current term in order to constrain the spending possibilities of 
future officeholders.136 One model suggests that representatives who 
desire a low-spending policy will over-rely on borrowing for the same 
reason.137 Or a representative may believe that his tenure in office 
depends on constituents who value current spending highly because 
they do not expect to pay their fair share of future taxes—either 
 
 134. See, e.g., 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. V, ch. III (Edwin Cannan, ed., Methuen & Co., 5th ed. 1904); DAVID 
RICARDO, Essay on the Funding System, in THE WORKS OF DAVID RICARDO 455 (McCulloch 
ed., 1846); Richard E. Wagner, Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion, and Budgetary Choice, 25 
PUB. CHOICE 45 (1976); see generally Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, Why Are Stabilizations 
Delayed? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3053, 1989), available at 
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4553028/alesina_whystabilizations.pdf?sequence=2. 
 135. See, e.g., Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, Why a Stubborn Conservative Would 
Run a Deficit: Policy With Time-Inconsistent Preferences, 104 Q. J. ECON. 325, 325 (1989). 
 136. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and 
Government Debt, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 403, 403 (1990) (offering the example of two parties 
who disagree about spending priorities, with each encouraged to use debt strategically). 
 137. See generally Roland Hodler, Elections and the Strategic Use of Budget Deficits, 148 
PUB. CHOICE 149 (2011) (explaining how an incumbent who prefers low public spending will 
use debt to constrain later high-spending officials).  
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because they expect to move or because they expect to pay a low tax 
rate in the future. 
Politicians’ preferences are of course constrained. At times, the 
popular will has reflected a powerfully antidebt sentiment. After the 
defaults of the 1840s, the people in many states ratified constitutional 
amendments aimed at eliminating or at least reducing the tendency to 
rely on borrowing.138 Those were different times, of course, and most 
scholars believe the amendments did little to curb debt in the long 
term.139 But those amendments do indicate a limit to society’s 
tolerance of debt. Agency theories of excessive debt do not reject that 
principle; they posit only that states tend to overborrow. 
 But why would voters tend not to punish politicians for spending 
on unworthy projects, even if the spending is put off to the future? A 
partial explanation looks to the differences among constituents in the 
proportion of benefits received from spending initiatives and costs 
borne under current and anticipated tax policy. Perhaps constituents 
who benefit from excessive debt are better able to form powerful 
coalitions. Dispersion on the part of those harmed may prevent them 
from learning about borrowing policy, from doing anything about it, 
or both. On another prevalent account, many residents are simply 
fiscally deceived.140 Current taxes and levels of services are salient, but 
people do not perceive as clearly the consequences of future 
obligations to repay: out of sight, out of mind. A former Chicago 
alderman speaking recently about the city’s looming pension crisis 
nicely summed up this agency theory of excessive debt: “Voters don’t 
care about pensions as an abstract issue. . . . What they care about are 
the effects over the next two years of having to cut services or raise 
taxes to pay for this.”141 What these explanations have in common is 
the assumption of a voting public that is ill-suited to monitor and 
discipline spendthrift politicians. 
 
 138. See Roin, supra note 64, at 1975 (“Constitutional limitations on the use of state 
government debt did not appear until the 1840s.”); Silvers, supra note 3, at 42 (“When states 
were unable to repay their borrowings, they went through painful periods of fiscal adjustment 
that led to the adoption in most states of rules forbidding states to run operating deficits and 
limiting borrowing to funding discrete capital investments.”).  
 139. Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo & John Joseph Wallis, Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Crises, in 
WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 3, at 9, 37; Roin, supra note 64, at 1977–78. 
 140. See generally Wagner, supra note 134 (describing how taxpayer perceptions of the cost 
of government can be influenced by the complexity of methods used to finance public output).  
 141. Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Chicago Sees Pension Crisis Drawing Near, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/us/chicago-
sees-pension-crisis-drawing-near.html (quotation marks omitted).  
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One might expect market forces to constrain politicians’ appetite 
for borrowing even if voters do not. In the corporate-debt market, for 
example, lenders carefully monitor their borrowers’ leverage. The 
higher the leverage, the greater the risk of default if revenues 
decrease relative to market expectations.142 To compensate for the 
risk of default, lenders therefore charge higher interest rates to more 
highly leveraged firms, all else being equal. At some point credit 
simply dries up. This may be true in the state-debt markets, too, and it 
would suggest a ceiling to state indebtedness. But because lenders 
care about risk-adjusted returns rather than the wisdom of their 
borrowers’ expenditures, the point at which creditors simply stop 
lending is not likely related to optimal fiscal policy. 
III.  TAX-CREDIT BORROWING AND RISK EXTERNALIZATION 
Risk externalization depends on the possibility of federal succor, 
and its importance grows with the likelihood that financial distress 
will meet a receptive audience in Washington. Those concerned with 
the associated moral hazard have observed that federal aid is more 
likely when a state can claim an inability to service its massive debt 
burden. The pathetic appeal to helplessness, coupled with the threat 
of spillover effects and contagion that might follow a disorderly 
default, therefore combine to powerful effect. Seeking to relieve 
bailout pressure, and therefore moral hazard, a number of scholars in 
the last few years have proposed legislation permitting states to seek 
bankruptcy relief.143 The details have varied, but they generally have 
taken as a model Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
This Part gives background on Chapter 9 and the state-
bankruptcy debate, and argues that voluntary debt-adjustment 
mechanisms are unlikely to dampen moral hazard. It then shows how 
tax-credit borrowing could more effectively achieve the aims 
motivating proposals for state-bankruptcy legislation. 
A. Background: Chapter 9 and the State-Bankruptcy Debate 
Prior to the Great Depression, no formal mechanism existed by 
which the debt of public entities could be restructured. In 1933, 
 
 142. Leverage refers to the ratio between the debts a firm owes and its assets. A low degree 
of leverage implies a large equity cushion to absorb losses before they affect creditors. 
 143. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Triantis, supra note 44, at 240; Adam 
Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 
81–83 (2012).  
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Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to allow distressed towns and 
cities to adjust debts that had become unsustainable as the national 
economic malaise persisted.144 This legislation was addressed in 
particular to the familiar problem of holdout creditors. When a 
debtor entity’s liabilities become too great relative to its ability to 
generate revenue, a measure of relief can be in the best interests of 
the debtor and its creditors alike. The Great Depression undoubtedly 
saw many such cases.145 Individual creditors may nevertheless 
withhold consent to a sensible plan of adjustment in an effort to 
capture a greater share than that to which they would otherwise be 
entitled. The principal sponsor of the first municipal-bankruptcy 
legislation had just this dynamic in mind: “In every instance where a 
governmental unit finds itself in financial difficulty and is able to 
make some satisfactory agreement of adjustment with the majority of 
its creditors, there is always a small minority who hold out and 
demand preferential treatment.”146 The 1933 amendments sought to 
overcome holdout by permitting a federal judge to approve a 
settlement acquiesced to by a supermajority of creditors.147 
The Supreme Court promptly held the amendments 
unconstitutional, on the puzzling theory that the federal government’s 
grant of an option to discharge debts intruded on state sovereignty.148 
(Bankruptcy was purely optional because involuntary petitions of the 
type familiar to individual and corporate bankruptcy were 
forbidden.149) Congress enacted substantially identical legislation in 
1937, and after the famous “switch in time” the Court upheld the new 
 
 144. Unlike state legislatures, Congress may impair the obligation of contracts under its 
authority “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) 
(holding that the Bankruptcy Clause empowers Congress “to discharge the debtor from his 
contracts and legal liabilities”). 
 145. See generally, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 
(1942); Randall S. Kroszner, Is It Better to Forgive Than to Receive? An Empirical Analysis of 
the Impact of Debt Repudiation (Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 481, 2003).  
 146. To Amend the Bankruptcy Act: Municipal and Private Corporations: Hearings on H.R. 
1670, H.R. 3083, H.R. 4311, H.R. 5009, and H.R. 5267 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
73rd Cong. 22 (1933) (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox). 
 147. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 526 (1936) 
(“After hearing, the judge shall confirm the plan, if satisfied that it is fair, equitable, for the best 
interests of the creditors, does not unduly discriminate, complies with the statute, and has been 
accepted by those holding two-thirds of the indebtedness.”). 
 148. Id. at 531. 
 149. Id. at 524–25. 
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bill.150 Federal law has provided some kind of municipal-bankruptcy 
process ever since. The regime in effect today was in large measure 
established with the advent of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. Others 
have admirably canvassed the significance of Chapter 9’s various 
provisions;151 I need not replicate their work here. A few of the details 
are, however, important to the questions this Article raises, and it will 
be useful to touch on them briefly. 
One important set of rules concerns eligibility. Chapter 9 is 
available to “municipalities” only,152 on a strictly voluntary basis.153 A 
municipality seeking relief must be empowered to do so by state law, 
must be insolvent, and before filing a petition must try to reach an 
accommodation with creditors unless “such negotiation is 
impracticable.”154 The insolvency requirement is particularly 
important. With respect to Chapter 9, the Bankruptcy Code adopts a 
cash-flow understanding of insolvency, providing that a municipality 
is insolvent only if it is “generally not paying its debts as they become 
due” or is “unable to pay its debts as they become due.”155 Some 
federal courts have understood this to mean that Chapter 9 is 
available only if a municipality will be unable to pay its bills within 
the fiscal year (taking borrowing capacity and taxing powers into 
account).156 In this way the Bankruptcy Code circumscribes quite 
narrowly the domain of municipal bankruptcy, perhaps too 
narrowly.157 
It is important to understand something of the law’s reach as well 
as its subject. Here again, Chapter 9’s ambition may seem modest. In 
a corporate reorganization under Chapter 11, the bankruptcy judge 
may if necessary cram down a plan of reorganization with widespread 
 
 150. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51–54 (1938). 
 151. The best scholarly introduction to, and evaluation of, Chapter 9 is still McConnell & 
Picker, supra note 12. 
 152. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2012). 
 153. Id. § 303(a) (2012) (“An involuntary case may be commenced only under chapter 7 or 
11 of this title.”). 
 154. Id. § 109(c)(2)–(3), (5) (2012). 
 155. Id. § 101(32)(C) (2012). 
 156. In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336–37 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); In re Villages at 
Castle Rock Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 84 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).  
 157. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 456–57 (“While the gatekeeper function 
reduces the moral hazard of easy debt relief, the insolvency standard almost certainly makes 
both creditors and debtor worse off in those cases actually culminating in bankruptcy.”). 
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consequences for the debtor enterprise.158 Chapter 11 plans routinely 
contemplate the sale of a significant percentage of assets, the spinoff 
of entire business units, or even the total reconstitution of governance 
through auction.159 In Chapter 9 proceedings, by contrast, the 
bankruptcy judge may do little more than approve a plan reducing 
the municipality’s debts in a manner consistent with the “fair and 
equitable” standard.160 The court has no power to decree that a debtor 
entity’s assets or taxing power be put to a particular use; it cannot 
compensate frustrated creditors with the keys to City Hall.161 Chapter 
9 is thus oriented toward a singular function—the elimination of debt 
overhang. 
The first proposals for a state-bankruptcy law were premised on 
this model. Consistent with the origins of municipal bankruptcy, 
proponents noted the potential of legislation to cure debt overhang.162 
But their bête noir was a different animal: the moral hazard of risk 
externalization.163 Advocates of a state-bankruptcy procedure take the 
view that the existence of an orderly process for adjusting state debts, 
a process with the patina of law, could weaken the political argument 
in favor of federal assistance. As one commentator put it, “The 
appeal of bankruptcy-for-states is that it would give the federal 
government a compelling reason to resist the bailout urge.”164 This, in 
turn, could ameliorate states’ moral hazard by forcing them and their 
creditors jointly to internalize the risks of bad fiscal conditions. The 
proposed law would mirror Chapter 9 in important respects. To avoid 
 
 158. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012) (setting out conditions on satisfaction of which a plan “shall” 
be confirmed). A cramdown refers to a plan confirmed over the objection of at least one class of 
creditors. 
 159. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Reply, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 673, 675–85 (2003). 
 160. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (incorporating relevant portions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012)). 
 161. Id. § 904 (2012) (“Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents 
or the plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case or 
otherwise, interfere with—(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2) any 
of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-
producing property.”). Notwithstanding this literal reservation of power, commentators have 
noted that a bankruptcy judge could push for changes to governance structure by refusing to 
confirm any plan that did not “consent” to favored changes. E.g., Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, 
supra note 10, at 293–95 (“[T]he apparently clear rule that the court may not require resource 
adjustments becomes more opaque once one considers the discretion that a court does have to 
condition the grant of relief in Chapter 9 on the political will of residents to accept them.”). 
 162. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 10, at 687–88. 
 163. Feibelman, supra note 143, at 93; Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 10, at 691; 
Triantis, supra note 44, at 238. 
 164. Skeel, Give States, supra note 9, at 3. 
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constitutional doubt, resort to the procedure would need to be 
voluntary. The bankruptcy judge would be empowered to impose a 
plan of adjustment on holdout creditors, but would have few other 
powers (again out of concern for state sovereignty). The process 
would also allow states to reject and renegotiate onerous executory 
contracts, in particular labor deals that were the product of collective 
bargaining.165 
Academic reception of proposed state-bankruptcy procedures 
has been as mixed as the political response. Skeptical commentators 
have lodged two general objections: first, that the particular moral 
hazard is simply not a significant determinant of state financing 
policy;166 and second, that for structural and constitutional reasons 
bankruptcy is ill-suited to the task of reforming state behavior.167 At 
least one pair of commentators has charged that state bankruptcy 
would in practice be used as a Republican tool to punish labor 
unfairly.168 Others have considered the general idea of a restructuring 
mechanism sound, but have quibbled over the design. Could states 
strategically invoke the prospect of bankruptcy to achieve even better 
bailout terms?169 Perhaps it would be better to enact a “minimalist” 
adjustment mechanism limited to ratifying haircuts agreed to by a 
supermajority of creditors,170 or to supply states with a menu of 
choices.171 My purpose here is not to critique each conceivable 
 
 165. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012) (“Except as provided . . . the trustee, subject to the court’s 
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract . . . .”). Chapter 11’s restrictions on the 
modification of collective-bargaining contracts do not apply in Chapter 9. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a); In 
re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 166. See Levitin, supra note 3, at 221 (“There is a vast literature on the political economy of 
budget deficits. Although it identifies many political economy factors that may contribute to 
deficits, it has identified political agency problems as a particular cause, as politicians seeking 
private benefits and subject to limited electoral discipline run up state spending without 
corresponding revenue increases.”); Silvers, supra note 3, at 56 (“[F]ederal-state transfers 
necessary to keep states economically healthy are relatively small amounts compared to the aid 
given to the financial system or the tax breaks offered or renewed at a federal level since 2007. 
It is not an issue of money; it is an issue of political honesty and political will—the honesty to 
admit that states are not really fiscally independent of the federal government and the will to act 
responsibly in accordance with that reality.”).  
 167. Gelpern, supra note 10, at 1113; Levitin, supra note 3, at 214–15; Schragger, supra note 
25, at 881–82.  
 168. Catherine Fisk & Brian Olney, Labor and the States’ Fiscal Problems, in WHEN STATES 
GO BROKE, supra note 3, at 253, 293. For a more thorough explication of the prevailing 
critiques of state-bankruptcy proposals, see generally Skeel, Is Bankruptcy, supra note 10. 
 169. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 10, at 328.  
 170. Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 331.  
 171. Triantis, supra note 44, at 242 n.11. 
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permutation of federal legislation. This excursion is rather meant to 
establish two points about the state-bankruptcy debate. First, whether 
they support or oppose a formal debt-adjustment process, scholars 
almost unanimously assume that some kind of congressional action 
would be needed to achieve it.172 Second, the starting place for the 
debate has been Chapter 9. 
B. State Eligibility for Chapter 9 Absent Legislation 
Undoubtedly, states are formally ineligible for bankruptcy relief. 
The Bankruptcy Code permits only a “municipality” to be a debtor 
under Chapter 9,173 and that term is defined as a “political subdivision 
or public agency or instrumentality of a State.”174 The states 
themselves are excluded by implication. Congressional amendment 
would be necessary to bring a state qua state within the Bankruptcy 
Code’s ambit. 
In functional terms, though, the states are free to structure their 
debts so as to fit the Bankruptcy Code’s capacious definition of a 
“municipality.” Suppose that Illinois wished to become Chapter 9–
eligible. It could charter an instrumentality—call it Schmillinois—for 
the sole purpose of issuing the state’s debt. Schmillinois would issue 
general-obligation bonds; it would promise to back state employees’ 
pension rights; it would cut checks to the state’s trade creditors. In 
short, Schmillinois would act as the state’s financing arm, funded 
presumably through annual appropriations. Yet it would not be the 
state. It would have none of the sovereignty vested in the state by the 
Constitution, and it would exist firmly under the state’s dominion. In 
form, Schmillinois would resemble the many other instrumentalities 
and agencies with authority to act within the state, without regard to 
the geographical boundaries associated with towns and cities. 
There is no reason to think a special-purpose instrumentality of 
this kind would not qualify as a “municipality.” Courts interpreting 
the term’s meaning for eligibility purposes have looked to a variety of 
factors. They have considered, for example, the extent to which a 
would-be petitioner engages in traditional governmental functions; 
the extent to which the putative municipality is subject to state rather 
than private control; and, perhaps most importantly, whether the 
 
 172. Id. at 240–41; McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 229; Levitin, supra note 3, at 214–
16. But see Hynes, supra note 10, at 698 (arguing that composition under state law is sufficient). 
 173. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2012). 
 174. Id. § 101(40). 
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state itself categorizes the entity as a municipality or 
instrumentality.175 Schmillinois would seem to withstand scrutiny quite 
easily.176 
Chapter 9’s availability to states as a debt-adjustment mechanism 
suggests that the question scholars have been debating—namely, 
whether Congress should enact state-bankruptcy-enabling 
legislation—should be restated. The question is rather why states 
have not availed themselves of the power they already have to make 
their debt adjustment-eligible. This section explores possible 
explanations that suggest a skeptical point of view not only about 
“Chapter 9 for states,” but indeed about the utility of virtually any 
restructuring mechanism that turns on state consent. 
The most obvious explanation of the states’ continued Chapter 9 
ineligibility is that state leaders have not thought eligibility possible. 
To be sure, this Article marks, as far as I am aware, the first 
suggestion that states can effectively opt into Chapter 9 eligibility. 
The existing literature is to the contrary, and explicitly so.177 In 
general, it is precisely states’ assumed ineligibility that has motivated 
proposals for federal legislation in the first place. But failure of 
imagination is not an altogether satisfying explanation. State 
policymakers have long used instrumentalities and special-purpose 
districts to carry out state capital projects and operations. 
Instrumentalities are often used to impose state-level policies in the 
face of local opposition; at other times they are used to incur debt for 
state-desired projects otherwise frustrated by balanced-budget 
amendments and other restrictions on indebtedness.178 And these 
instrumentalities are not always geographically defined—consider, for 
 
 175. See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 795 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010). 
 176. Eligibility litigation to date has turned on whether an entity should be classified as a 
municipality (in which case Chapter 9 is appropriate), or as a business firm (which must petition 
under Chapters 7 or 11, but not 9). Courts have not been asked to decide whether a would-be 
petitioner is a state. But for the reasons I give, it is hard to see how an entity with powers limited 
by charter could be confused with a sovereign state.  
 177. Levitin, supra note 3, at 214–16; McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 229; Schwarcz, 
supra note 10 at 326; Triantis, supra note 44, at 240–41. Richard Hynes has documented how 
states may, and perhaps already do, take advantage of Chapter 9 by moving obligations from 
the state ledger to the balance sheets of various state-administered instrumentalities. See Hynes, 
supra note 10, at 683–90. In some respects the structure I suggest is quite similar to this 
“synthetic” bankruptcy: both models turn on the juridical difference between a sovereign and its 
instrumentalities. Yet the model here suggested would effectively allow for the adjustment of 
the entirety of a state’s capital structure. 
 178. See Roin, supra note 64, at 1978–80 (explaining this phenomenon and offering an 
example from the Seattle Mariners’ baseball stadium). 
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example, state university systems. In the history of municipal 
bankruptcy, the vast majority of petitions have been filed on behalf of 
these quasi-state entities rather than traditional towns and cities.179 
Given the prevalence of instrumentalities in state operations and 
particularly in the world of municipal bankruptcy, it is rather hard to 
believe that no one has considered going whole hog. 
Another possibility is that state policymakers simply regard 
Chapter 9 as ineffectual and hence not worth the (modest) 
transaction costs that becoming eligible would entail. This 
explanation has some bite at first glance. Scholars and practitioners 
alike have shrugged at the limited benefits of municipal bankruptcy 
since its most recent incarnation in 1979. Chapter 9’s requirement 
that a municipality be insolvent before seeking protection is a 
particularly counterproductive hurdle. It is unclear what it means for 
a municipality to be “unable” to pay debts becoming due within the 
fiscal year. A weak version of “inability” would describe something 
like the political infeasibility of raising sufficient revenue to pay 
creditors in light of, for example, necessary operational expenses and 
the reality of voter preferences. On this view bankruptcy judges might 
defer in some measure to the representations of elected officials, who 
presumably are best situated to describe the conditions of the 
electorate. But a stronger version would look to the theoretical power 
of a jurisdiction to meet the year’s obligations, whether by further 
tapping the credit markets or through a combination of tax increases 
and spending reductions. At some point, marginal tax increases and 
spending cuts will reduce a jurisdiction’s total revenue. But the 
precise definition of a jurisdiction’s Laffer curve180 is anyone’s guess; 
and to the extent a municipality bears the burden of persuasion on 
this score, the insolvency requirement can dramatically reduce 
Chapter 9’s usefulness.181 Financial distress is often a problem long 
before a municipal debtor cannot pay in the strong sense. By that 
point, it may be a story of too little, too late. 
 
 179. Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 359 n.43, 360–61 (2010) (describing Chapter 9 as “used by tiny 
municipalities under peculiar circumstances”).  
 180. The Laffer curve illustrates the idea that tax rates affect productivity. See Jude 
Wanniski, Taxes, Revenues, and the “Laffer Curve,” 50 PUB. INT. 3, 3–7 (Winter 1978). At a tax 
rate of 0 percent, the government collects no revenue. At a rate of 100 percent, it similarly 
collects very little, because those subject to taxation lack incentive to produce (and indeed they 
may spend resources trying to evade taxation). The maximum revenue a government can collect 
in tax will lie at some unknown intermediate rate.  
 181. McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 456.  
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The relatively narrow powers of the bankruptcy judge in Chapter 
9 may also limit its usefulness. As mentioned above, the bankruptcy 
court has no power to restructure a debtor municipality along the 
lines of Chapter 11.182 The bankruptcy judge cannot order changes to 
the municipality’s geographical boundaries or to its governance 
structures.183 Nor can she decree tax increases or spending 
reductions.184 Some have argued that a forum in which adjustments to 
taxing and spending rates are on the table would be preferable to the 
present regime.185 
Yet ultimately the limited scope of Chapter 9 cannot explain 
states’ perceived ineligibility. Whether amendments could make 
Chapter 9 more valuable is an important issue, but at this point a 
secondary one. A state could become bankruptcy-eligible for the cost 
of repairing a few dozen potholes. And Chapter 9 does seem to 
provide some net value in the municipal context. Many states think 
so, anyway.186 Otherwise they would withhold permission for their 
municipalities to seek relief. 
A better explanation lies in the very moral hazard that has 
motivated calls for state-bankruptcy legislation. Disinterested 
observers may rue the threat of contagion on either efficiency or 
distributive grounds. They may see it as a distorting influence on state 
financial policy or as an unjustified affront to proper federal–state 
relations. From the perspective of a too-big-to-fail state, though, 
things look quite different. The threat of contagion turns the federal 
government into a (partial) guarantor of state debt, which reduces the 
cost of borrowing. Being contagious, then, is valuable. Any 
mechanism that reduces the possibility of a bailout is bad in the 
state’s eyes for the same reason the general polity approves it. If state 
 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 159–62. 
 183. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) (prohibiting judicial “interfere[nce]” with, among other things, 
“any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor”). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 10, at 284–86. 
 186. The states as a whole are mixed on this. See Kenneth E. Noble & Kevin M. Baum, 
Municipal Bankruptcies: An Overview and Recent History of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL (July 23, 2013), available at http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=c47c30f7-e91f-4398-82f3-f0ce5d2ef704 (“Twelve states specifically authorize 
chapter 9 filings, while 12 others permit bankruptcy filings given a further action to be taken by 
a state, official or other entity. In addition, three other states authorize a limited subset of 
municipalities to file for bankruptcy. The remaining 23 states do not authorize municipal 
bankruptcy filings.”).  
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bankruptcy can be expected to reduce states’ incentive to seek federal 
bailouts, why would a state opt in voluntarily? 
The primary virtue of Chapter 9, such as it is, lies in its capacity 
to eliminate debt overhang by reducing a distressed municipality’s 
liabilities over the objection of holdout creditors.187 If its debt burden 
becomes too great, a city may be unable to raise revenue even for 
capital expenditures and operations that a vast majority of residents 
would be inclined to pay for. The residents, knowing that a large 
fraction of each marginal dollar paid into the communal chest is 
destined for creditors’ pockets, will tend to lobby for minimal taxes 
and fees. Adjusting debts may be the best solution for the city’s 
residents and creditors alike, and Chapter 9 provides a mechanism 
through which to accomplish this objective. 
Yet to judge the potential appeal of Chapter 9 to a state, one 
must first reflect on the state’s own power to address debt overhang 
and related problems without a bankruptcy process. Without 
bankruptcy, as previously discussed, state political actors enjoy an 
effectively unilateral power to restructure debt ad hoc.188 Indeed, 
under settled doctrine a Chapter 9 proceeding would constrain rather 
than enhance state politicians’ discretion. One implication of state 
sovereign immunity, and the states’ corresponding ability to 
restructure debt through default, is that debt overhang is a red 
herring. When a firm’s or an individual’s debt burden is too great, the 
existence of the debt may preclude otherwise efficient junior and 
equal-priority investment. For the business firm, this means difficulty 
raising equity financing or unsecured credit. For an individual, debt 
overhang may, for example, discourage labor or investment in human 
capital. In theory, debt overhang could have the same effect on a 
political entity. But because states can eradicate debt overhang 
through default, it is hard to see why they need to invoke a 
bankruptcy process, the aim of which is to relieve this very problem.189 
The upshot is that state actors might lack interest in Chapter 9 
because they realize that they can achieve its greatest promise—
 
 187. The common-pool problem is of limited significance to a municipality. Under 
longstanding doctrine, creditors have minimal ability to foreclose on municipal assets and so to 
destroy going-concern value. For a thorough explanation, see McConnell & Picker, supra note 
12, at 430–33. 
 188. This unilateral power represents a significant moral hazard that increases the states’ 
cost of borrowing, all else being equal. For discussion of overcoming the moral hazard, see supra 
text accompanying note 148.  
 189. Others have made this general point. Gelpern, supra note 12, at 894.  
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reduction of debt overhang—through unilateral action. In Chapter 9, 
a state would need to appeal to a bankruptcy judge’s discretion in 
cramming down a plan of adjustment (assuming at least one 
dissenting class of creditors).190 Outside bankruptcy, the federal 
imprimatur is unnecessary. 
In talking this way I hope to avoid falling into a composition 
fallacy. With apologies to Professor Kenneth Shepsle for borrowing 
his classic phrase, a state is a “they,” not an “it.”191 Not everyone with 
political influence in the statehouse benefits from moral hazard. 
Those who seek stability, or who have less to gain from marginal 
spending or marginal tax relief, for example, could be expected to 
lobby for measures reducing moral hazard. If public choice has taught 
us anything, it is the unpredictable and often unstable nature of 
political accommodation. Yet it is still useful to think about the 
incentives of a “state,” just as it is valuable to think about the 
incentives of a business firm. Horse-trading among constituencies, as 
among corporate stakeholders, tends to move collective policy along 
the path of least resistance. In the case of a potentially contagious 
state, that path is the one which increases rather than decreases the 
likelihood of federal assistance. 
These considerations help explain more than just states’ failure 
to make themselves eligible for Chapter 9. They also suggest why 
nearly any ex post federal restructuring measure is doomed to fail if it 
requires state consent.192 State political actors will prefer to set their 
own terms of restructuring, through default, and to threaten disorder, 
 
 190. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (incorporating the requirements to cram down found in 
Chapter 11 corporate reorganizations, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)). 
 191. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent 
as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992).  
 192. Existing proposals for a state-bankruptcy statute uniformly presume that a law under 
which creditors could force states into court involuntarily would be unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
Bush & Gingrich, supra note 9 (“[N]either the federal government nor state creditors could 
push an unwilling state into bankruptcy, no matter how catastrophic the state’s finances may be, 
as this would violate the U.S. Constitution’s protection for a state’s sovereign immunity.”). It is 
worth noting that, as a matter of existing doctrine, this is far from clear. In Central Virginia 
Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), the Supreme Court held that Congress may 
abrogate state sovereign immunity via its power to make “uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 
(2006). Katz concerned the power of a bankruptcy court to order relief against a state as the 
recipient of a preferential transfer; it did not speak directly of the power to authorize 
involuntary petitions. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012). But the Court’s rationale suggests that Congress 
could abrogate immunity as it sees fit in the bankruptcy context. See Gelpern, supra note 12, at 
899 n.29. Still, the meaning of Katz is largely academic, since even if involuntary bankruptcy for 
the states would be constitutional, it is politically infeasible. 
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rather than capitulate to the jurisdiction of a federal bankruptcy 
judge. 
C. Tax-Credit Borrowing as a Solution 
Tax-credit borrowing furnishes a more effective deterrent. The 
optimistic intuition at play is straightforward. The federal 
government’s incentive to bail out is related to the risk of possible 
spillover effects and contagion associated with a disorderly state 
default. Sudden, unexpected shortfalls can send shockwaves through 
the entire associated economy. But tax-credit bonds preclude default. 
Without default, the logic goes, there is less threat of a federal bailout 
because there is a less credible threat of contagion. Knowing this ex 
ante, the state and its creditors are forced to internalize the risk of 
bad fiscal conditions. More precisely, since the debt is risk-free, the 
state’s “residual claimants”—its residents, its voters—are forced to 
internalize the risk of financial distress. This in turn should lead to 
lower levels of borrowing. 
Of course, contagion is not the only reason the federal 
government may be inclined to assist distressed states, and it remains 
possible that federal assistance of other kinds may simply replace the 
dreaded bailout. A significant part of state money already comes in 
the form of grants-in-aid not tied to creditor recoveries. Put 
succinctly, the question is whether the federal government will simply 
replace one form of assistance with another. In some limited sense the 
answer must be that it will. Already some federal grants are 
predicated on the states’ relative financial health. Medicaid, for 
example, ties the share of federal matching funds to the average 
income of a state’s residents.193 Because a state’s financial problems 
tend to reduce that average income, they simultaneously increase the 
federal government’s generosity. One could see this kind of assistance 
as an analogue to federal flood insurance, for example. This is the 
pathetic appeal to help fellow citizens who face hard times without 
“fault.” Yet spillover effects surely matter, in addition to the fellow 
feeling that defines national identity. And to the degree that 
externalities in this context are a function, in part, of the disorder and 
uncertainty of default, a default-proof borrowing mechanism should 
reduce the federal tendency to intervene even if it cannot hope to 
eliminate intervention altogether. 
 
 193. Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A Challenge to 
Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 860 (1990). 
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The feasibility of tax-credit borrowing depends in the first 
instance on voluntary state action. It is the state that must choose to 
finance with tax offsets. This presents a puzzle. If one of the principal 
effects of a tax-credit borrowing regime is to reduce the states’ ability 
to externalize risk by credibly threatening default, why would a state 
willingly play along? The same logic that undermines voluntary debt-
adjustment proposals would seem to cast the same shadow on tax-
credit borrowing. 
In some measure, federal legislative action is probably needed to 
spur tax-credit borrowing. At minimum, as noted earlier, the Tax 
Code would need to be amended to undo what is in effect a subsidy of 
traditional bond borrowing.194 But indeed, parity is likely not enough. 
A relative subsidy of tax-credit borrowing would likely be necessary 
to overcome states’ natural interest in risk externalization. If it 
becomes cheaper to borrow with tax credits than with traditional 
indebtedness, then state decisionmakers must weigh beforehand the 
value of cheaper debt against the expected value of risk 
externalization.195 What the exact size of the relative subsidy must be 
is, of course, a difficult empirical question. Quite apart from the will 
of policymakers, the expected liquidity of secondary markets in these 
new instruments would affect investors’ appetite to buy tax-credit 
bonds offering after-tax yields equal to those of traditional bonds. 
Some amount of experimentation would be needed; and indeed, one 
of the virtues of introducing tax-credit borrowing would be its 
potential to tell us something about the degree of risk externalization 
that is actually at play in the political economies of the states. It is 
enough here to suggest that relatively small changes in federal tax 
policy could do much to encourage tax-credit borrowing. 
IV.  TAX-CREDIT BORROWING AND AGENCY PROBLEMS 
Now suppose that risk externalization is not a significant driver 
of state borrowing patterns. Perhaps states borrow the “right” 
amount. To the extent they overborrow (relative to their alternative 
opportunities to increase tax revenue or decrease spending), the 
reason is a standard agency problem.196 Those affected by a state’s 
 
 194. See supra text accompanying note 112.  
 195. Because the relative subsidy would be a matter of public knowledge, it should have 
little if any redistributive effect among the states. Depending on the particulars, it could either 
increase or decrease the total amount of state borrowing. 
 196. See supra Part II.B. 
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economic activity imperfectly monitor politicians, who find it in their 
self-interest to finance current expenditures with debt. If this is the 
best way to think about excessive state debt, what are the implications 
of a tax-credit borrowing regime? This turns out to be a complex 
question dependent on a number of assumptions about state political 
economy. I cannot venture a comprehensive analysis here, but it will 
be useful to sketch the beginnings of what one might look like. 
Tax-credit borrowing could affect state fiscal policy in two 
respects. First, and most obviously, the power to issue risk-free debt 
could reduce a state’s borrowing costs by eliminating the default 
premiums creditors inevitably charge.197 At first blush, this would 
seem to imply more debt. The cheaper a good, the more one expects 
to see consumed. But the effect is not altogether clear in this case, 
because issuing risk-free debt also has implications for the monitoring 
of political actors. A creditor bearing the risk of default has an 
incentive to lobby or otherwise push for fiscal policies that will ensure 
future solvency. A creditor holding risk-free debt has no such 
incentive. The intuition can be put more generally. To the extent a 
state borrows against future tax credits, it shifts the incidence of 
financial ruin (and therefore the monitoring incentive) from creditors 
to “residual” constituencies, in particular residents and voters.198 
A shift toward tax-credit borrowing need not be wholesale. 
States could issue tax-credit debt to some but not other classes of 
creditors. To illustrate, suppose there are two kinds of creditors, X 
and Y, and an undifferentiated public, P. In a traditional borrowing 
regime, all three actors have some incentive to monitor fiscal policies, 
but the incentive for each is curbed by the free-rider effect. If the 
state begins to borrow with tax credits only, the monitoring incentive 
is placed squarely on P. If the state adopts a mixed strategy, 
borrowing from X with tax credits and from Y with traditional 
promises to pay, then the monitoring incentive shifts to Y and P. If an 
agency problem is the cause of excessive state debt, then placing the 
monitoring incentive with the best-situated constituency or 
constituencies could lessen the problem and reduce overall financing 
costs. Now suppose that X and Y correspond to dispersed foreign 
bondholders and union-represented domestic employees, 
respectively. Between the two of them, the public employees would 
 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 27–30.  
 198. Even more particularly, the cost of imprudent fiscal decisions falls on the owners of real 
property and other immovable assets.  
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seem to be the better monitors. Their coalition is stable and 
organized, and they wield voting power. If this is right, then a state 
might rationalize its fiscal policies by issuing tax-credit bonds coupled 
with traditional pension promises. 
This example is meant only to be illustrative. It is not 
immediately obvious which creditor class or classes are best situated 
to monitor state debt, or whether any are better situated than the 
undifferentiated public. It is a difficult question because monitoring in 
this context requires both incentive and political power. A single 
foreign creditor holding, say, a billion dollars of state debt has a 
strong monitoring incentive, but is relatively impotent; he lacks the 
kind of recourse that secured creditors typically enjoy in the private 
debt markets. Dispersed voters have relatively little monitoring 
incentive, but collectively they may have the most power to discipline 
political actors. In the municipal context, two recent articles have 
argued that bondholders are better monitors than residents and 
therefore should bear default risk.199 This may or may not be right. 
The argument focuses on monitoring incentives but ignores the 
efficacy of monitors’ tools. A rigorous monitoring analysis would 
need to consider both incentives and power, and would need to take 
into account the wide variety of constituent classes. Bondholders and 
voters are but two of many. 
One appealing attribute of tax-credit borrowing is its capacity to 
solve this dilemma, if only imperfectly, by allowing classes of creditors 
to sort themselves through trade. Suppose a state wishes to raise $100 
through borrowing, and that it elects to do so by issuing $50 of 
tradable tax credits and $50 of traditional debt. The tax-credit 
borrowing will offer a lower yield, to be sure, but one could conclude 
that rational creditors will be indifferent as between the investments 
because the default premium should be expected to equal the 
likelihood of a default times the expected loss in case of default.200 
Nevertheless, this presumed indifference does not hold if lenders 
perceive themselves as having varying degrees of political influence. 
The lender who believes himself relatively powerless, for whatever 
 
 199. See Gillette, supra note 25, at 654–76; Richard C. Schragger, Citizens Versus 
Bondholders, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 789–93 (2012). 
 200. See Modigliani & Miller, supra note 29, at 288 (“[T]he cut-off point for investment . . . 
will be completely unaffected by the type of security used . . . . [W]e may say that regardless of 
the financing used, the marginal cost of capital to a firm is equal to the average cost of capital, 
which is in turn equal to the capitalization rate for an unlevered stream in the class to which the 
firm belongs.”). 
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reason, will be inclined to buy tax-credit bonds. On the other hand, 
the lender who believes herself to be relatively effective at influencing 
fiscal policy will choose the higher yield—traditional debt—on the 
theory that, with her influence, the yield implies an overstated 
expected cost of default. Put differently, those lenders who believe 
they have a relative monitoring advantage will prefer traditional debt 
precisely because they think they can reduce the likelihood of default 
relative to what one expects in a world where states issue traditional 
debt only. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has introduced tax-credit borrowing as a solution to 
one increasingly important problem of state finance: the moral hazard 
associated with credible threats of contagion. Widespread use of a 
risk-free form of debt should indeed reduce the federal government’s 
incentive to intervene with assistance aimed at preventing the 
disorder and the uncertain chain reaction associated with default. To 
be sure, tax-credit borrowing could prove itself a kind of Maginot 
Line: advantage being the mother of invention, states might find 
other, less obvious means of externalizing risk. But in any event, the 
considerations this Article has outlined suggest that an ex ante 
financing solution would be more effective than ex post restructuring 
initiatives that depend on state consent, which in this context looks 
very much like unilateral disarmament. 
Yet tax-credit borrowing may ultimately find its most valuable 
application in other domains. For those who doubt that risk 
externalization plays a significant role in excessive state debt (or even 
doubt that states systematically overborrow), the selective use of risk-
free debt augurs very different prospects. An enlightened political 
class could, for example, use superpriorities to reduce the cost of 
borrowing from politically weak persons or classes. By placing the 
incidence of default on politically powerful coalitions, tax-credit 
borrowing could more broadly help to rationalize state finance. Or 
venal politicians might use superpriority borrowing to insulate 
favored constituencies and inefficiently reduce their monitoring 
incentives. How these dynamics would likely play out is a difficult 
question of political economy, and this Article has sought only to 
gesture in its direction. What this Article has shown, I hope, is that 
tax-credit borrowing offers policymakers and investors alike a chance 
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at greater certainty in a world where sovereign immunity still looms 
large. 
 
